Tokenless biometric transaction authorization method and system

ABSTRACT

A method and system for tokenless authorization of commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system. A transaction is proposed by a seller, and the buyer signals his acceptance by entering his personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one biometric sample, forming a commercial transaction message. The commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system, where the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with previously registered buyer biometric samples. If the computer system successfully identifies the buyer, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, and the results of the transaction are presented to both buyer and seller. As a result of the invention, a buyer can conduct commercial transactions without having to use any tokens such as portable man-made memory devices such as smartcards or swipe cards. The invention allows buyers to quickly select one of a group of different financial accounts from which to transfer funds. The invention further indicates to the user that the authentic computer system was accessed by the use of a private code that is returned to the buyer after the identification is complete. The invention additionally permits an authorized buyer to alert authorities in the event of an emergency, such as when a transaction is coerced.

The present application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 08/442,895, filed May 17, 1995, now U.S. Pat. No.5,613,012, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 08/345,523, filed Nov. 28, 1994, now U.S. Pat. No. 5,615,217,which are incorporated herein by reference.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The use of a token, an inanimate object which confers a capability tothe buyer presenting it, is pervasive in today's financial world.Whether a consumer is buying groceries with a debit card or shopping ina department store with a credit card, at the heart of that transactionis a money transfer enabled by a token, which acts to identify both theconsumer as well as the financial account being accessed.

From their inception in the late 1950s, token-based financialtransactions have grown increasingly more prevalent at the point ofsale. However, as token-based transfers have become more popular withconsumers, they have also become more popular with criminals intent onfraud. Currently, fraud losses in the industry stem from many differentareas, but they are mainly either lost, stolen, or counterfeit cards.

Credit cards operate without the use of a personal identification number(PIN). This means that a lost credit card can easily be turned into cashif the card falls into the wrong hands. While theft of a tokenconstitutes the majority of fraud in the system, fraud from counterfeitcredit cards is rising rapidly. Counterfeit credit cards aremanufactured by a more technically sophisticated criminal who acquires acardholder's valid account number, produces a valid-looking counterfeitcard, encodes the magnetic strip, and embosses the counterfeit plasticcard with the account number. The card is then repeatedly presented tomerchants until the account's credit limit is reached. Another form ofloss is caused by a criminal seller or his employees who surreptitiouslyobtains the cardholder's account number and enter fictitioustransactions against the card and then take cash out of the till. It isestimated that losses due to all types of fraud exceeds one billiondollars annually.

Generally, debit cards are used in conjunction with a personalidentification number (PIN). Lost debit cards do not generally result infraud, unless the owner of the card wrote his PIN on the card.Furthermore, successfully counterfeiting a debit card is more difficultthan with a credit card, since the criminal must acquire not only theaccount number, but also the PIN, and then manufacture the card as inthe credit card example. However, various strategies have been used toobtain PINs from unwary cardholders; these range from Trojan horseautomated teller machines (ATMs) in shopping malls that dispense cashbut record the PIN, to fraudulent seller point of sale devices that alsorecord the PIN, to criminals with binoculars that watch cardholdersenter PINs at ATMs. The subsequently manufactured counterfeit debitcards are then used in various ATM machines until the unlucky account isemptied.

Customer fraud, for both credit and debit cards, is also on the rise.Customers intent on this sort of fraud will claim that they lost theircard, say that their PIN was written on the card, and then withdrawmoney from their account using card, and then refuse to be responsiblefor the loss. The financial industry is well aware of the trends infraud, and is constantly taking steps to improve the security of thecard. However, the linkage between the buyer and his token is tenuous,and that is the fundamental reason behind card fraud today

One possible solution to stolen-card fraud involves placing PINprotection for magnetic stripe credit cards, much as debit cards havePINs today. This will raise the administrative costs for each card,since cardholders will undoubtedly wish to select their own PIN for eachof their 3.4 cards. In addition, this solution still doesn't address theproblem of counterfeit cards.

Another solution that solves both stolen-card fraud and greatly reducescounterfeit-card fraud involves using a smartcard that includes either abiometric or a PIN. In this approach, authenticated biometrics arerecorded from a user of known identity and stored for future referenceon a token. In every subsequent access attempt, the user is required tophysically enter the requested biometric, which is then compared to theauthenticated biometric on the token to determine if the two match inorder to verify user identity.

Various biometrics have been suggested, such as fingerprints, handprints, voice prints, retinal images, handwriting samples and the like.However, because the biometrics are generally stored in electronic (andthus reproducible) form on a token and because the comparison andverification process is not isolated from the hardware and softwaredirectly used by the buyer attempting access, a significant risk offraud still exists. Examples of this approach to system security aredescribed in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,821,118 to Lafreniere; 4,993,068 toPiosenka et al.; 4,995,086 to Lilley et al.; 5,054,089 to Uchida et al.;5,095,194 to Barbanell; 5,109,427 to Yang; 5,109,428 to Igaki et al.;5,144,680 to Kobayashi et al.; 5,146,102 to Higuchi et al.; 5,180,901 toHiramatsu; 5,210,588 to Lee; 5,210,797 to Usui et al.; 5,222,152 toFishbine et al.; 5,230,025 to Fishbine et al.; 5,241,606 to Horie;5,265,162 to Bush et al.; 5,321,242 to Heath, Jr.; 5,325,442 to Knapp;5,351,303 to Willmore, all of which are incorporated herein byreference.

An example of another token-based biometric smartcard system can befound in U.S. Pat. No. 5,280,527 to Gullman et al. In Gullman's system,the user must carry and present a credit card sized token (referred toas a biometric security apparatus) containing a microchip in which isrecorded characteristics of the authorized user's voice. In order toinitiate the access procedure, the user must insert the token into aterminal such as an ATM, and then speak into the terminal to provide abiometric sample for comparison with an authenticated sample stored inthe microchip of the presented token. If a match is found, the remoteterminal signals the host computer that the transaction should bepermitted, or may prompt the user for an additional code, such as a PINwhich is also stored on the token, before authorizing the transaction.

Although Gullman's reliance of comparison biometrics reduces the risk ofunauthorized access as compared to PIN codes, Gullman's use of the tokenas the repository for the authenticating data combined with Gullman'sfailure to isolate the identity verification process from thepossibility of tampering greatly diminishes any improvement to fraudresistance resulting from the replacement of a numeric code with abiometric. Further, the system remains inconvenient to the consumerbecause it too requires the presentation of a token in order toauthorize a transaction.

Uniformly, the above patents that disclose commercial transactionsystems teach away from biometric recognition without the use of tokens.Reasons cited for such teachings range from storage requirements forbiometric recognition systems to significant time lapses inidentification of a large number of individuals, even for the mostpowerful computers.

Unfortunately, any smartcard-based system will cost significantly morethan the current magnetic stripe card systems currently in place. A PINsmartcard costs perhaps $3, and a biometric smartcard will cost $5. Inaddition, each point of sale station would need a smartcard reader, andif biometrics are required, a biometric scanner will also have to beattached to the reader as well. With 120 million cardholders and 5million stations, the initial conversion cost is from two to five timesgreater than the current annual fraud losses.

This large price tag has forced the industry to look for new ways ofusing the power in the smartcard in addition to simple commercialtransaction. It is envisioned that in addition to storing credit anddebit account numbers and biometric or PIN authentication information,smart cards may also store phone numbers, frequent flyer miles, couponsobtained from stores, a transaction history, electronic cash usable attollbooths and on public transit systems, as well as the buyer's name,vital statistics, and perhaps even medical records.

The net result of "smartening" the token is centralization of function.This looks good during design, but in actual use results in increasedvulnerability for the consumer. Given the number of functions that thesmartcard will be performing, the loss or damage of this monster cardwill be excruciatingly inconvenient for the cardholder. Being withoutsuch a card will financially incapacitate the cardholder until it isreplaced. Additionally, losing a card full of electronic cash will alsoresult in a real financial loss as well.

Thus, after spending vast sums of money, the resulting system willdefinitely be more secure, but will result in heavier and heavierpenalties on the consumer for destruction or loss of the card.

To date, the consumer financial transaction industry has had a simpleequation to balance: in order to reduce fraud, the cost of the card mustincrease. As a result, there has long been a need for a commercialtransaction system that is highly fraud-resistant, practical, convenientfor the consumer, and yet cost-effective to deploy.

There is also a need for a commercial transaction system that uses astrong link to the person being identified, as opposed to merelyverifying a buyer's possession of any physical objects that can befreely transferred. This will result in a dramatic decrease in fraud, asonly the buyer can authorize a transaction.

A further need in a commercial transaction system is ensuring consumerconvenience by providing authorization without forcing the consumer topossess, carry, and present one or more proprietary objects in order toauthorize a transaction. All parties intent on fighting fraud recognizethat any system that solves the fraud problem must take the issue ofconvenience into account, however the fundamental yet unrecognized truthof the situation is, the card itself can be very inconvenient for theconsumer. This may not be initially obvious, but anyone who has lost,left at home, or had a card stolen knows well the keenly andimmediately-felt inconvenience during the card's absence.

Yet another need in the industry is for a transaction system thatgreatly reduces or eliminates the need to memorize multiple orcumbersome codes. Such a system must allow a user to access all of hisaccounts, procure all services to which he is entitled, and carry outtransactions in and between all financial accounts, make point ofpurchase payments, etc.

There is further a need for a commercial transaction system that affordsa consumer the ability to alert authorities that a third party iscoercing the transaction without the third party being aware that analert has been generated. There is also a need for a system that isnevertheless able to effect, unknown to the coercing third party,temporary restrictions on the types and amounts of transactions that canbe undertaken.

Lastly, such a system must be affordable and flexible enough to beoperatively compatible with existing networks having a variety ofelectronic transaction devices and system configurations.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention satisfies these needs by providing an improvedcommercial transaction method between a buyer and a seller using acomputer system that comprises the following steps.

First, there is a buyer registration step where a buyer registers a PIN,at least one biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account.Each financial account has an associated account index code that isassigned by the buyer during registration. The biometric samples, thePIN, the financial accounts, and the index codes are stored in thecomputer system

Then, the seller is registered in a seller registration step. The sellerregisters at least one financial account with the computer system, andis given a seller identification code.

Once both buyer and seller are registered, transactions can take place.A seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to a buyer in aproposal step, describing the product or service being sold, the price,and the seller's identification code.

The buyer can then accept the proposed transaction in an acceptance stepby adding his buyer's personal authentication information to thecommercial transaction proposed by the seller. The authenticationinformation includes the buyer's biometric sample and a PIN. Inaddition, the buyer must submit his account index code, which specifieswhich of the buyer's financial accounts to debit. This acceptedtransaction is called a commercial transaction, which is forwarded tothe computer system in a transmission step.

After receiving the commercial transaction, the computer system attemptsto identify the buyer. The computer system compares the biometricsamples and the PIN added by the buyer to the commercial transactionwith previously registered biometric samples and PINs in a buyeridentification step. If a match is found, the buyer is identifiedsuccessfully, otherwise the buyer is not identified and the transactionfails.

Once the buyer is identified, the computer system in a payment stepdetermines the financial account of the buyer using the buyer's accountindex code as well as the financial account of the seller using theseller identification code, both of which are provided by the commercialtransaction. Once both accounts are identified, the computer systemdebits the account of the buyer and credits the account of the seller.If there are insufficient resources in the buyer's financial account,the transaction fails.

In an alternate embodiment, the computer system constructs a transactiongiven the buyer and seller financial accounts, the transaction amount,and the associated transaction information, and forwards the transactionto an external computer system, such as one operated by VISAInternational, where the money transfer occurs and any status of successor failure returned by the external computer system is forwarded by thecomputer system to the buyer and seller.

When the computer system completes an operation, such as a registrationof a buyer or a seller, or a particular transaction succeeds or fails, apresentation step provides the results of the operation to the buyerand/or the seller.

In this manner, commercial transactions are conducted without the buyerhaving to use any portable man-made memory tokens such as smartcards ormagnetic stripe cards.

In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the identification stepoccurs in less than two seconds, which is a commercially acceptabletimeframe.

For situations where the buyer is coerced into making a transaction, anembodiment of the invention provides a mechanism for a buyer to signalthat the transaction is being performed under duress. Multiple emergencymethods are provided. One method is an emergency account index codewhich, when employed by the buyer during the acceptance step, allows thetransaction to proceed, but in addition sends a silent alarm to theauthorities during the payment step. The other method allows the buyerto select an emergency PIN which, when entered during the acceptancestep and detected by the computer system during the buyer identificationstep, results in a successful transaction while at the same time sendinga silent alarm.

In both emergency methods, the buyer can specify the steps that thecomputer system will take or cause to be taken when a silent alarmoccurs, including placing artificial financial resource limits on thebuyer's accounts, the presentation of false information or financialdata, the presentation of a different private code at the end of thetransaction, the rejection of the transaction, the notification of thealarm to the authorities, or the notification of the alarm to theseller.

In some situations, it may be possible for people intent on fraud tosubstitute fake transaction stations for actual transaction stations inorder to capture an unsuspecting buyer's biometric and PIN. To counterthis, another embodiment of the invention provides a way for the buyerto authenticate the system. During registration, the buyer selects aprivate code in addition to biometric, PIN, financial accounts, andaccount index codes. The private code is unrelated to the PIN, and isnot used to gain access to the system. The private code is displayed tothe buyer at the end of each transaction. Only the computer system andthe buyer know the private code, which is never entered by the buyerduring the transaction. Since a fake station cannot display the privatecode to the buyer, any attempt to steal biometric and PIN information isimmediately obvious to a buyer.

For some transactions, it is not appropriate to conduct an immediatedebit/credit of accounts. These cases include transactions where theexact amount to be transferred is not known at the time ofauthorization, or when a deposit is reserved by the seller for securityreasons that will probably never be collected. As a result, in analternate embodiment of the invention, the computer system causes acredit authorization draft to be constructed up to the limit supplied inthe commercial transaction, instead of executing an immediatedebit/credit transaction.

In yet another embodiment of the invention, the computer systemcommunicates with one or more external computer systems in order toperform various functions, including determining if the buyer hassufficient resources, the debiting of a buyer's financial account, thecrediting of the seller's financial account, or the construction of acredit authorization draft.

In another embodiment of the invention, the buyer is remote from theseller, and transaction proposals and other information is transmittedfrom seller to buyer and vice versa using a computer network such as theInternet.

In yet another embodiment of the invention, the seller identificationcode is identical to the seller's financial account.

In another embodiment of the invention, each account index code hasassociated with it a name assigned by the account owner duringregistration. This account name can be displayed during authorization inthe event the owner forgets which accounts are available for use.

In most instances, the buyer being identified and the computer systemare remote and physically separate from each other.

All electronic communications to and from the computer system areencrypted using industry standard encryption technology, preferably theDES (Data Encryption Standard) with 112-bit encryption keys. Eachidentification station has its own set of encryption keys that are knownonly to that particular station and the computer system.

It is preferred that the invention include a method for comparing thebiometric samples during registration with a collection of biometricsamples from buyers who have been designated as having previouslyattempted to perpetrate fraud or who have actually perpetrated fraudupon the system, thus eliminating registration of repeat offenders.

Yet another embodiment of the invention creates increased assurance ofaccurate identification by comparing a buyer's biometric from among abasket of other biometrics, the basket being a subset of all storedbiometrics in the system. This is done by first comparing the buyer'sbiometric with all others in the basket and storing his in that basketonly when it is deemed to be sufficiently dissimilar from the otherbiometrics therein.

In another embodiment of the invention, the buyers choose their own PINfrom a group of PINs provided by the computer system. Once the buyer'sbiometric is gathered, the data processing center selects several PINsat random which may be conducive to being memorized. The computer systemthen conducts a comparison of the biometric gathered with those alreadyin those PIN baskets. In the event the new registrant's biometric is toosimilar to any of the registered biometrics currently in the particularPIN basket, that PIN is rejected and an alternative PIN is selected foranother such biometric comparison. Once the computer system hasgenerated several PIN options without a confusingly similar biometric,these PINs are presented to the new registrant from which the buyer mayselect one PIN.

In another embodiment of the invention, in the unlikely event of thetheft of biometric information, the situation can be remedied by simplychanging the PIN basket in which the person's biometric samples reside.After this is done, the criminal can no longer use the biometric sampleto authorize transactions.

The present invention is clearly advantageous over the prior art in anumber of ways.

First, it is extremely easy and efficient for the consumer to usebecause it eliminates the need to carry and present any tokens in orderto access one's accounts. The present invention eliminates all theinconveniences associated with carrying, safeguarding, and locatingtokens. Further, because tokens are often specific to a particularcomputer system that further requires remembering a secret PIN codeassigned to the particular token, this invention eliminates all suchtokens and thereby significantly reduces the amount of memorization anddiligence increasingly required of consumers by providing protection andaccess to all financial accounts using only one personal identificationnumber. The consumer is now uniquely empowered, by means of thisinvention, to conveniently conduct his personal and/or professionalelectronic transactions at any time without dependence upon tokens whichmay be stolen, lost or damaged.

The invention is clearly advantageous from a convenience standpoint toretailers and financial institutions by making purchases and otherfinancial transactions less cumbersome and more spontaneous. Thepaperwork of financial transactions is significantly reduced as comparedto credit card purchases wherein separate receipts are generated andmust be retained by the seller and the consumer.

Because the system of the invention is designed to provide a consumerwith simultaneous direct access to all of his financial accounts, theneed for transactions involving money, checks, credit drafts and thelike will be greatly reduced, thereby reducing the cost of equipment andstaff required to collect, account, and process such transactions.

Further, the substantial manufacturing and distributing costs of issuingand reissuing all tokens such as credit cards, debit cards, telephonecalling cards and the like will be eliminated, thereby providing furthereconomic savings to issuing banks, and ultimately to consumers.

Moreover, the invention is markedly advantageous and superior toexisting systems in being highly fraud resistant. As discussed above,present authorization systems are inherently unreliable because theybase determination of a user's identity on the physical presentation ofa manufactured object along with, in some cases, information that theuser knows. Unfortunately, both the token and information can betransferred to another, through loss, theft or by voluntary action ofthe authorized user. Thus, unless the loss or unintended transfer ofthese items is realized and reported by the authorized user, anyonepossessing such items will be recognized by existing authorizationsystems as the consumer to whom that token and its correspondingfinancial accounts are assigned.

By contrast, the present invention virtually eliminates the risk ofgranting access to unauthorized users by determining identity from ananalysis of a user's unique characteristics. Even in the very rarecircumstance of coercion, where an authorized buyer is coerced by acoercing party to access his accounts, the system anticipates anemergency account index code, whereby the authorized user can alertauthorities of the transgression without the knowledge of the coercingparty.

The invention further prevents fraud by storing authenticationinformation and carrying out identity verification operations at alocation that is operationally isolated from the user requestingauthorization, thereby preventing the user from acquiring copies of theauthentication information or from tampering with the verificationprocess. Such a system is clearly superior to existing token-basedsystems wherein the biometric authentication information are stored onand can be recovered from the token, and wherein the actual identitydetermination is performed at the same location as the user during theauthorization process.

It is an object of the invention therefore to provide a commercialtransaction system that eliminates the need for a user to possess andpresent a physical object, such as a token, in order to authorize atransaction.

It is another object of the invention to provide a commercialtransaction system that is capable of verifying a user's identity basedon one or more unique characteristics physically personal to the user,as opposed to verifying mere possession of proprietary objects andinformation.

Yet another object of the invention is to provide a commercialtransaction system that is practical, convenient, and easy to use, wherebuyers no longer need to remember multiple PINs to protect multipleaccounts.

Another object of the invention is to provide increased security in avery cost-effective manner, by completely eliminating the need for evermore complicated and expensive tokens.

Still another object of the invention is to provide a commercialtransaction system that is highly resistant to fraudulent accessattempts by non-authorized users.

Yet another object of the invention is to provide a commercialtransaction system that enables a consumer to notify authorities that aparticular transaction is being coerced by a third party without givingnotice to said third party of the notification.

Another object of the invention is to provide a commercial transactionsystem that automatically restricts a consumer's transactioncapabilities according a desired configuration provided by the user whena transaction is being coerced.

Still another object of the invention is to authenticate the system tothe user once the commercial transaction is complete, so the user candetect any attempt by criminals to steal their authenticationinformation.

Another object of the invention is to be added in a simple andcost-effective manner to existing online credit and debit terminalscurrently installed at points of sale around the world. These and otheradvantages of the invention will become more fully apparent when thefollowing detailed description of the invention is read in conjunctionwith the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a diagram of the system of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a diagram of the Data Processing Center (DPC) and its internaldatabases and execution modules;

FIG. 3 is a diagram of the retail point of sale terminal, the biometricinput apparatus and its components, and the interconnections betweenthem;

FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the operation of the biometric input apparatusand the terminal for generating a commercial transaction message;

FIG. 5 is a representational diagram of a sample commercial transactionmessage;

FIG. 6 is a representational diagram of a sample commercial transactionresponse message;

FIG. 7 is a flow chart depicting the data encryption and sealing processat the biometric input device;

FIG. 8 is a flow chart depicting the message decryption and selleridentification validation at the DPC;

FIG. 9 is a flow chart depicting the data encryption and sealing processat the DPC;

FIG. 10 is a flow chart representing the registration of a buyer duringthe registration process;

FIG. 11 is a flow chart of the operations performed in order totransmit, execute, and present the results of a commercial transactionmessage;

FIG. 12 is a flow chart of the biometric identification process at theDPC;

FIG. 13 is a flow chart of the silent alarm process at the DPC;

FIG. 14 is a flow chart of the execution of a transaction by an externalcomputer system;

FIG. 15 is a flow chart of the execution of a transaction by the DPC;

FIG. 16 is a flow chart of the construction of a response message for agiven commercial transaction message;

FIG. 17 is a flow chart of the general steps taken during theauthorization of a commercial transaction;

FIG. 18 is a flow chart of the general steps taken during theauthorization of a commercial transaction in another embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The objective of this invention is to provide a tokenless, secure,reliable, safe, and consistent, method for identifying buyers for thepurpose of authorizing financial transactions for large numbers ofconsumers. It is the essence of this invention that consumers have theability to conduct these transactions without the use of any tokens,credit cards, badges or identification cards including drivers licenses.In order to be functional it is important that the system operate atspeeds similar to those currently in operation for completing financialtransactions such as credit card purchases and ATM services. The systemmust be secure, such that buyers' records and their biometricinformation remain confidential and safe, both within the computersystem that identifies the buyer and authorizes transactions, as well asduring collection and transfer of authentication information between thecomputer system and the remote sites with which the computer systemcommunicates.

Furthermore, the system must be reliable in that errors inidentification and authorization must be infrequent and not hamper ormake use of the system cumbersome. Since only the use of biometrics arecontemplated for identification of buyers, the system must also havesecurity measures during emergency cases to either reduce access, evento the authorized user, as well as notify authorities. It is appreciatedthat the system must be able to handle a large number of users, andaccommodate storage and transfer of large amounts of data, such asbiometric information, commensurate with speeds at which financialtransactions are carried on today.

Turning now to the figures, the overall configuration of the inventionand its components are shown in FIG. 1. Essentially a Data ProcessingCenter (DPC) 1 is connected to various terminals 2 through various typesof communication means 3. The DPC is also connected and communicateswith independent computer networks 4. The DPC contains several databasesand software execution modules as shown in FIG. 2. In a preferredembodiment of the invention, the databases are backed up or "mirrored"in distinct physical locations for safety reasons. The Firewall Machine5 is responsible for prevention of electronic intrusion of the systemwhile the Gateway Machine 6 is responsible for routing all requests fromthe user, including adding, deleting and otherwise modifying alldatabases. The Gateway Machine is also responsible for decryption andde-packaging of data that has arrived from the terminals using the MACMmodule 7, MDM module 8, and the SNM module 9. The PGL module 10, and theIML module 11 are used to locate the proper PIN code and biometricbasket. FIG. 3 depicts an example of a terminal 2 and the biometricinput device 12, which has a biometric scanner 13, data entry means suchas a key pad or PIN pad 14, and a display panel 15. The biometricscanner can be any one of fingerprint scanner, voice input device(microphone), palm print scanner, retinal scanner or the like, althoughthe fingerprint scanner will be used as an example. The biometric inputdevice is further equipped with computing modules 16, device drivers,and erasable and non-erasable memory modules. The biometric input devicecommunicates with the terminal through preferably a serial port 17. Theterminal 2 communicates through a modem 18 with the DPC 1 throughmessages 19 and responses 20 using one of the interconnecting means inFIG. 1 such as a cable TV network, cellular telephone network, telephonenetwork, the Internet, or an X.25 network. FIG. 4 shows arepresentational diagram of the commercial transaction message 19 andits method of generation by the biometric input device software. FIG. 5and FIG. 6 show a representational diagram of the commercial transactionmessage and response message. Furthermore, it is shown which parts ofthe messages are encrypted and which ones are sealed. FIG. 7 is a blockdiagram of the overall process for data encryption and sealing showingthe use of DUKPT key data 20 for encryption of data before appendingadditional data before sealing the message with a Message AuthenticationCode (MAC) 21. FIG. 8 and FIG. 9 show the encryption and decryptionprocess at the DPC. FIG. 10 shows the steps taken during theregistration of a new buyer. FIG. 11 describes the steps involved inprocessing a commercial transaction message, starting from its formationat the BIA, all processing by the DPC, and then finally the presentationof results by the BIA. FIG. 12 describes the biometric ID process at theDPC. FIG. 13 describes the processing of silent alarms at the DPC. FIG.14 and 15 describe the processing required to determine resources of abuyer and execute payment from a buyer to a seller, both internally tothe DPC as well as externally via an external computer system. FIG. 16describes how the DPC constructs a response to a particular commercialtransaction. FIG. 17 and FIG. 18 are a description on the steps taken toprocess a commercial transaction, from proposal through presentation ofresults.

Description of the drawings, diagrams, flow charts and the descriptionof the invention, including hardware components, software components,execution modules, databases, connection means, the data transferredbetween them, and the method of the invention is described in detail asfollows.

1.1. Biometric Input Apparatus (BIA) 1.1.1. Introduction

The BIA is a combination of hardware and software whose job is togather, encode, and encrypt biometric input for use in commercialtransaction. All actions of the BIA are directed by an outsidecontrolling entity called a terminal, which issues commands and receivesresults over the BIA's serial line.

BIA hardware comes in four basic versions: standard, wireless, andintegrated phone/cable television (or "CATV"). Each BIA hardware variantaddresses a particular need in the marketplace. Based on the differencesin construction, BIAs vary in their abilities to resist fraud, and soeach BIA has a device security assessment value which is set for eachBIA of that model type.

BIA software comes in seven basic versions: personal computer (or "PC"),retail, registration, internal, issuer, and integrated remote. Eachsoftware load provides a different, use-specific command set. Forinstance, the registration software load does not accept requests toform retail transaction messages. Likewise, the retail software commandset cannot send buyer registration messages. To provide another layer ofsecurity, the DPC knows what software package is loaded into each BIA;any attempts by a BIA to send a message that it is normally not able tosend is rejected by the DPC and the event is treated as a major securityviolation.

The ability of the invention to detect and combat seller-based fraudrelies on the fact that the BIA's external interface is strictlylimited, that the construction of the BIA makes it extremely difficultto tamper with the contents, that each BIA has its unique encryptioncodes that are known only to the DPC, and that each BIA is only allowedto perform operations limited to its designated function. Each biometricinput means has a hardware identification code previously registeredwith the DPC, which makes the biometric input means uniquelyidentifiable to the DPC in each subsequent transmission from thatbiometric input device.

The BIA is constructed with the assumption that the controlling terminalis a source for fraud and deception. Terminals range from softwareapplications running on personal computers to dedicatedhardware/software systems developed for a particular use such as aretail point of sale. Regardless of the particular model, no BIA revealsunencrypted biometric information. BIA models without display means(such as LCD or LED screens) must reveal selected information (such asprivate codes) to the terminal for display, and as a result thoseparticular terminal-BIA combinations are considered to be less secure.

Depending on the task at hand, BIA models are either partially or fullyintegrated with the terminal. Partially integrated devices arephysically separate from the terminal, and they include wireless andstandard retail point of sale BIAs. Fully integrated devices arecontained within the physical enclosure of the terminal itself, forinstance a telephone.

No BIA ever discloses any secret encryption codes to any externalsource.

1.1.2. BIA Models

Particular BIA hardware models have different configurations. They areintroduced in brief here:

BIA

Standard model has computing module, biometric scanner, display means,communications port, data entry means encased in tamper-resistant case,and electronic detection means.

BIA/Wireless

Standard model, but serial line replaced with a wireless communicationsmodule using external antenna. Used in restaurant point of sale.

BIA/Catv

Has a light-duty scanner and serial port, along with a multichip module.The fact that the display is part of the terminal and not the BIA meanslower security because it must reveal the private code to the terminal.Used in telephones and CATV remotes. Weakest security, both because thedisplay and PIN pad are part of the terminal not the BIA, and because ofthe low-cost nature of the market.

1.1.3. BIA Command Set Messages

Each BIA software command set provides a different set of operations.They are introduced briefly here:

BIA/Catv

Remote Commercial Transaction

List Accounts

BIA/Internal

Buyer Identification

BIA/Issuer

Issuer Batch

BIA/PC

Remote Commercial Transaction

List Accounts

BIA/Registration

Buyer Identification

Buyer Registration

List Accounts

BIA/Retail

Commercial Transaction

List Accounts

1.1.4. BIA Hardware: Standard Model

The Standard BIA hardware is a multichip module combined with asingle-print scanner, a display screen, a serial port, and a PIN padencased in a hard tamper-resistant case that makes attempts to penetrateobvious while also providing RF shielding for the contents. Thefollowing components are amalgamated into a multichip module, called theBIA Multichip Module (a process for encapsulating several processors inone physical shell, well known in the industry), constructed to protectthe communications pathways between the devices from easy wiretapping.

Serial processor

PIN pad processor

LCD screen processor

CCD scanner

A/D processor

High-speed DSP processor containing both flash and mask ROM

General-purpose microprocessor

Standard RAM

EEPROM

The following software packages and data are stored in mask ROM. MaskROM is cheaper than other types of read only memory, but it is easilyreverse engineered, and is not electronically erasable. As such only thenoncritical commonly available code are placed here.

MAC calculation library

DUKPT Key Management library

DES (with CBC) Encryption library

Base-64 (8-bit to printable ASCII) converter library

Public Key Encryption library

Embedded Operating System

Serial line device driver

LCD device driver

PIN pad device driver

Scanner device driver

Unique hardware identification code

Multi-Language profiles The following standard data and softwarepackages are stored in flash ROM. Flash ROM is more expensive, but it ismuch more difficult to reverse engineer, and most importantly, it iselectronically erasable. All of the more critical information is storedhere. Flash ROM is used in an attempt to increase the difficulty ofduplicating a BIA.

Unique DUKPT Future Key Table

Unique 112-bit MAC Key

DSP biometric quality determination algorithm

DSP biometric encoding algorithm

Random number generator algorithm

Command function table

The message sequence number, incremented each time a message is sentfrom the BIA, is stored in the EEPROM. EEPROM can be erased many times,but is also nonvolatile--its contents remain valid across powerinterruptions

The following data is stored in RAM. RAM is temporary in nature, and itscontents are lost whenever power is lost.

Encoded Biometric Register

PIN Register

Account Index Code Register

Amount Register

PIN-Block Key

Message Key

Response Key

8 General Registers

stack and heap space Each multichip module contains a "write-once"memory location that is irreversibly set following the initialization ofthe flash ROM. Whenever an attempt is made to download software to theflash ROM, this memory location is checked; if it is already been set,then the BIA refuses to load. This way, critical software and data keysmay only be downloaded once into the device, at the time of manufacture.

All registers and keys are explicitly cleared when a transaction iscanceled. Once a transaction is completed, registers are cleared aswell. Once a "form message" command is executed, biometric, PIN, andaccount index code registers are also cleared, along with any encryptionkeys that aren't required for subsequent use.

It is important that the software not keep copies of registers or keysin stack variables.

the following associated hardware components comprise the standard BIAhardware module.

BIA Multichip module

CCD single-print scanner

capacitance detector plate (known in the industry)

lighted PIN keypad with auxiliary buttons

2-line 40-column LCD screen

RF shielding

tamper-resistant case

serial connection (up to 57.6 kb)

breech detection hardware (known in the industry)

optional thermite charge attached to Multichip module (known in theindustry)

All temporary storage and internal hardware and software used tocalculate these values are secured, which means they resist any attemptto determine their current values, or their means of functioning. Thisfeature is essential for the security of the invention, just as it iscritical that the "wiretapping" of a BIA and specifically the gatheringof a Biometric-PIN Block for fraudulent means is made as difficult aspossible.

The multichip module and the components are physically connected to eachother without exposed wiring.

The enclosure protecting the electronic components of the BIA is weldedshut during manufacture; it cannot be opened under any circumstanceswithout significant damage to the case. Upon detecting any opening (ordamage) of the enclosure, the BIA performs an emergency electronic zeroof any and all keys residing in flash ROM, followed by all of thesoftware libraries. Specific breech detection methods are keptconfidential and proprietary.

In addition to protecting the contents, the case also shields theinternal operations from RF signal detectors.

Supersecure versions of the BIA exist whereby breech detection methodsare connected to a mechanism that physically destroys the multichipmodule as well as the detection methods themselves.

Auxiliary buttons are used to specify particular operations, such as thelist accounts operation, or the help operation, to display informationthat is not generally associated with a transaction.

1.1.5. BIA Hardware: Wireless Model

The Wireless version of BIA hardware is identical to the Standard modelin construction, except that it communicates with the terminal using aspread-spectrum wireless communications module instead of a standardserial port.

This version is designed to be used in locations such as restaurants,where transactions are authorized at the buyer's convenience.

This device contains no Serial Port, however it does have an externalantenna, and a spread-spectrum wireless serial transmission unit forcommunicating with the remote cash register Terminal.

1.1.6. BIA Hardware: Phone/CATV Model

The Phone/CATV version of BIA hardware is a multichip module combinedwith a single-print scanner and a serial port. The module is physicallyattached to the scanner, and the whole is encased in plastic in order tomake tampering more difficult. Some amount of RF shielding is providedfor the components.

This version is designed to be integrated with telephones and televisionremote controls. As a result, it makes use of the existing keypads andLCD or television screens to enter or display values, rather than havingits own display and keypad entry device. It also uses the communicationfacilities of the host terminal. For example, the television remote usesthe CATV cable network to send its signals to the DPC.

This hardware model is (in comparison with other models) relativelyinsecure, as it is intended that these devices cost as little aspossible, be lightweight, and integrate easily with existing low-costdevices.

Of course, higher-security versions with more complete enclosures arepossible and encouraged.

1.2. BIA Software 1.2.1. BIA Software Command Interface

The external interface to the BIA is much like a standard modem;commands are sent to it from a controlling terminal using the externalserial line. When a command completes, a response code is sent from theBIA to the terminal. The particulars of the BIA software commandinterface detailed below illustrate one particular embodiment; otherembodiments may mimic popular PIN pad interfaces, such as thosemanufactured by Verifone, Inc.

Each BIA software load supports a different set of operations. Forinstance, a retail load supports only commercial transactions, while aregistration load supports buyer identification and buyer registration.

All BIA data fields are in printable ASCII, with fields separated byfield separator control characters, and records separated by newlines.Encrypted fields are binary converted to 64-bit ASCII using the base-64conversion library (all known in the industry).

Both the personal ID code and the account index code can be one or morealphanumeric characters, which includes numbers, letters, and othercharacters. For foreign languages, this includes multiple-charactercombinations which are used to represent specific words or concepts inthat language, such as kanji characters. For BIAs that just have aten-digit keypad, the codes will simply be numbers as in a standard PINcode, though people may choose to use the standard telephone keypadalphabetic-to-keypad-number translations (e.g. ABC=1, DEF=2, etc.) tohelp them remember their codes.

1.2.1.1 Response Codes:

Out of time:

The time allotted for the command has expired. A message to that effectwill be displayed on the LCD screen, if available. When time expires fora given command, the BIA acts as if the cancel button was pushed.

Canceled:

The "cancel" button has been pushed, and the entire operation has beencanceled. This has the side effect of clearing all information which wasgathered. A message to that effect will be displayed on the LCD screen,if available.

OK:

The command was successful.

Other:

Each command may have specific other response codes which are valid onlyfor it. These response codes will generally have text accompanying thecode, which will be displayed on the LCD screen if it is available.

Message:

This indicates that the command is ongoing, but that the BIA wants tosend a message to the terminal with an interim result message. Theresult is also displayed on the LCD, if available. This facility is usedfor prompts, as well as status messages.

1.2.1.2 Commands

In the argument list of the commands below, the <> characters surroundindividual arguments, ! characters surround optional arguments, and the| character indicates that a given argument may be comprised of one ofthe choices presented.

Set Language <language-name>

This command selects from one of a number of different languages encodedwithin the BIA for prompting for user input.

Get Biometric <time> primary|secondary!

This command requests the BIA to activate its scanner to get biometricinput from the buyer, storing it into the Encoded Biometric Register.

First, the message "Please place finger on lighted panel" is displayedon the LCD panel and returned to the terminal. The scanner pad isilluminated, prompting the buyer to enter his biometric.

A <time> value of zero means that there is no limit to the time forbiometric scan input.

When in scanning mode, a fingerprint scan is taken and given apreliminary analysis by the print quality algorithm. If the scan is notgood enough, the BIA continues to take new scans until <time> secondspass. As time passes and snapshots of the print are taken and analyzed,messages are posted to the LCD screen and sent to the terminal based onthe problems detected by the print quality software. If no print ofappropriate quality is forthcoming, the BIA returns an error code oftime expired, displaying a message to that effect on the LCD.

Once the print quality algorithm affirms the quality of the print scan,the print's minutiae are then extracted by the print encoding algorithm.Only a subset of the minutiae are selected at random, with care taken toretain enough sufficient for identification. These minutiae are thenordered randomly, and are placed in the Encoded Biometric Register,producing a bid biometric sample. Then the BIA responds with the successresult code.

If the primary|secondary! is specified (only available in the buyerregistration command set) then the entire minutiae set is selected, notjust the smaller subset, producing a registration biometric sample.Likewise, primary/secondary biometric selection ends up placing theencoded biometric into the appropriate register.

Whether or not the operation succeeds, as soon as scanning hasterminated, the light indicating that scanning is in progress is turnedoff.

It is important that the same biometric input yields differentencodings, so as to complicate the task of anyone attempting to discoverthe encryption codes of a captured BIA. This is accomplished by theselection of a random subset or random ordering of the encodedbiometric, although other methods are possible.

Get PIN <time>

This command requests the BIA to fill the PIN Register by reading fromthe keypad.

First, the message "Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>" isdisplayed on the LCD display and sent to the terminal, the appropriatekeypad lights are turned on, and then keypad scanning begins.

Scanning terminates when either <time> number of seconds runs out, orwhen the buyer hits the "enter" key.

Note that the digits of the PIN are not displayed on the LCD panel, butfor each digit the buyer types, a star "*" appears to give the buyerfeedback. When the "correction" key is pressed, the last digit enteredis erased, allowing the buyer to fix input mistakes.

When PIN input terminates, the keypad lights turns off.

If successful, the command returns OK.

Get Account Index Code <time>

First, the message "Now enter your account index code, then press<enter>" is displayed on the LCD and sent to the terminal. This promptsthe buyer to enter his account index code. When each key is pressed,that value appears on the LCD panel. The correction button can bepressed to erase one of the values. When the "enter" button is pressed,the Account index code register is set.

During input, the appropriate keypad keys are lit, and when input isconcluded, the keypad lights are turned off.

If successful, the command returns OK.

Validate Amount <amount> <time>

The Validate Amount command sends the message "Amount <amount> OK?" tothe terminal, and displays it on the LCD screen. If the buyer confirmsthe amount by hitting the "yes" (or enter) button, the Amount Registeris set to <amount>. The <amount> value must be a valid number, with nocontrol characters or spaces, etc. During prompting, the yes, no, andcancel buttons are lit. Once prompting is complete, all the lights areturned off. This amount, along with the currency, forms the priceinformation on a commercial transaction.

If the buyer enters "no", then the transaction is canceled.

Enter Amount <time>

The Enter Amount command sends the message "Enter amount" to theterminal, and also displays it on the LCD screen as well. The buyer mustthen enter the dollar amount himself. Each character entered isdisplayed on the LCD screen. All appropriate buttons are lit. If theenter button is hit, the Amount Register is set to be the value enteredon the keyboard. Once entry is complete, all the lights are turned off.

This can be used for transactions where the buyer wishes to enter thetotal amount he will pay, perhaps as a result of a combination of apurchase with cash-back.

Assign Register <register> <text>

The assign register command sets the designated General <register> tohave the value <text>. This is used to set information such as theseller identification code, the product information, and so on.

Get Message Key

The Get Message Key command causes the BIA to generate a 112-bit randomkey to be used by the controlling hardware to encrypt any message bodythat the controlling device wishes to add to the message. That generatedkey is returned by the BIA in hexadecimal format (known in theindustry). The message key are then added to the biometric-PIN block.

Form Message <(type=buyer identification|commercial transaction . . . >

The form message command instructs the BIA to output a messagecontaining all the information it has gathered. It also checks to makesure that all the registers appropriate to that specific message <type>have been set. If all required registers are not set, the BIA returnswith an error. The specific command set software will determine whichmessages can be formed by that BIA model; all others will be rejected.

Each message includes a transmission code consisting of the BIA's uniquehardware identification code and an incrementing sequence number. Thetransmission code allows the DPC to identify the sending BIA and todetect resubmission attacks.

The BIA uses the DUKPT key management system to select the biometric-PINblock encryption 112-bit DES key from the Future Key Table. This key isthen used to encrypt the Biometric-PIN Block using cipher block chaining(CBC). In addition, a response DES key is also generated randomly, andis used by the DPC to encrypt the portions of the response that need tobe encrypted.

Splitting the response key from the biometric-PIN block key is veryimportant, since each encryption key must be used only within thecontext of its own responsibilities. That way, if someone were to breakthe key encoding the private code, it would not result in the disclosureof the biometric-PIN. All personal authentication information (thebiometric and PIN) is stored within the biometric-PIN block.

The Biometric-PIN block consists of the following fields:

300-byte authorization biometric

4-12 digit PIN

112-bit response key

optional 112-bit message key!

Note that the message key is only present if the controlling terminalhas requested a message key for this message. It is up to thecontrolling terminal to encrypt any message body attached to thecommercial transaction message using the message key.

Once all encryption is complete, the BIA outputs the body of theappropriate request message (such as a Commercial Transaction message),terminated by and protected with the Message Authentication Code (MAC).

The MAC field is calculated using the BIA's secret 112-bit DES MAC key,and covers all message fields from first to last. The MAC assures theDPC that nothing in the message has changed effectively sealing themessage, while still allowing the plaintext fields to be inspected bythe controlling terminal.

When the Form Message command is done, the BIA sends the message "I'mtalking to DPC Central" to the terminal as well as displaying it on theLCD screen, indicating that work is proceeding on the request.

The command returns OK in addition to returning the entire formedmessage upon completion of the command.

Show Response <encrypted response> <time>

The Show Response command instructs the BIA to use its current ResponseKey to decrypt the response from the system.

After decryption, a chime sounds or the PIN pad light flashes, and theprivate code is displayed on the LCD screen for <time> seconds. At notime does this command transmit the decrypted private code to thecontrolling terminal.

Any other information located in the response message is returned to theterminal, such as an authorization code that is returned from a creditauthorization. Thus, existing systems that require two-step transactionscan be accommodated.

Reset

The Reset command instructs the BIA to clear all temporary registers,the LCD screen, all temporary Key registers, and to turn off all keypadlights that may be on.

Set PIN <value>

This command assigns the BIA's PIN Register to be <value>.

Note that allowing a non-secured device to provide the PIN is apotential security problem, because non-secured devices are much morevulnerable to wiretapping or replacement.

Set Account index code <value>

This command assigns the BIA's Account index code Register to be<value>.

Note that allowing a non-secured device to provide the account indexcode is a potential security problem, because non-secured devices aremuch more vulnerable to wiretapping or replacement.

Set Amount <value>

This command assigns the BIA's Amount Register to be <value>.

Decrypt Response <encrypted response message>

The Decrypt Response command instructs the BIA to use its currentResponse Key to decrypt the encrypted portion of the response message.Once decrypted, the response is returned to the controlling device,presumably for display on the terminal's LED screen.

Note that providing this decryption ability is a security problem, asonce the plaintext leaves the BIA, the terminal has the ability to dowith it what it will.

1.2.2. BIA Software: Support Libraries

The BIA software is supported by several different software libraries.Some of them are standard, generally available libraries, but some havespecial requirements in the context of the BIA.

1.2.2.1. Random Number Generator

Since the BIA is constantly selecting random DES keys for use in themessage body and message response encryption, it is important that thekeys selected be unpredictable keys. If the random number generator isbased on time of day, or on some other externally-predictable mechanism,then the encryption keys will be much more easily guessed by anadversary that happens to know the algorithm. The security of theencryption techniques used in the BIA assumes that both the randomnumber generator algorithm as well as the encryption algorithms are bothpublicly known.

One such random number algorithm for generating DES keys is defined inANSI X9.17, appendix C.

1.2.2.2. DSP Biometric Encoding Algorithms

The biometric encoding algorithm is a proprietary algorithm for locatingthe minutiae that are formed by ridge endings and bifurcations on humanfingertips. A complete list of minutiae is stored in the DPC as areference, while only a partial list is required by the algorithm whenperforming a comparison between an identification candidate and aregistered buyer.

During both registration as well as identification, the encodingalgorithm must find a reasonable number of minutiae points. Otherwise,the BIA will ask for the biometric to be re-entered.

1.2.2.3. Operating System and Device Drivers

The BIA is a real-time computing environment, and as such requires areal-time embedded operating system to run it. The operating system isresponsible for taking interrupts from devices and scheduling tasks.

Each device driver is responsible for the interface between theoperating system and the specific hardware, such as the PIN pad devicedriver, or the CCD Scanner device driver. Hardware is the source forevents such as "PIN pad key pressed," or "CCD Scanner scan complete".The device driver handles such interrupts, interprets the events, andthen takes action on the events.

1.2.2.4. DES Encryption Library

There are any number of DES implementations publicly available. DESimplementations provide a secret key-based encryption from plaintext tociphertext, and decryption from ciphertext to plaintext, using 112-bitsecret keys.

1.2.2.5. Public Key Encryption Library

Public Key encryption support libraries are available from Public KeyPartners, holders of the RSA public key patent (known in the industry).Public Key cryptosystems are asymmetric encryption systems that allowcommunication to take place without requiring a costly exchange ofsecret keys. To use a public key encryption system, a public key is usedto encrypt a DES key, and then the DES key is used to encrypt a message.The BIA uses public key cryptosystems to provide for the secure exchangeof secret keys.

1.2.2.6. DUKPT Key Management Library

The derived unique key per transaction key (DUKPT) management library isused to create future DES keys given an initial key and a messagesequence number. Future keys are stored in a Future Key Table. Onceused, a given key is cleared from the table. Initial keys are only usedto generate the initial future key table. Therefore the initial key isnot stored by the BIA

The use of DUKPT is designed to create a key management mechanism thatprovided a different DES key for each transaction, without leavingbehind the trace of the initial key. The implications of this are thateven successful capture and dissection of a given future key table doesnot reveal messages that were previously sent, a very important goalwhen the effective lifetime of the information transmitted is decades.DUKPT is fully specified in ANSI X9.24.

DUKPT was originally developed to support PIN encryption mechanisms fordebit card transactions. In this environment, it was critical to protectall transactions. An assumption is made that a criminal recordsencrypted transactions for a six month period, and then captures andsuccessfully extracts the encryption code from the PIN pad. The criminalcould then manufacture one new counterfeit debit card for each card usedduring that six month period.

Under DUKPT, however, the criminal's theft and reverse engineering wouldnot allow him to decrypt previous messages, although new messages wouldstill be decryptable if the criminal were to replace the PIN padsubsequent to reverse engineering.

In the biometric-PIN situation, the criminal has an even harder time, aseven if messages are decrypted, turning a digital biometric-PIN into aphysical fingerprint is much harder than turning an account number-PINinto a plastic card, which is one of the significant benefits of thetokenless system.

Still, if a criminal can decrypt, he can encrypt, which might allow himto electronically submit a biometric-PIN to the system to authorize afraudulent transaction. While this is quite difficult, it is still bestto restrict the options available to the criminal as much as possible,hence the use of DUKPT.

1.3. BIA Software Command Sets 1.3.1. BIA Software: Retail Command Set

The BIA/Retail software interface exports an interface that allowsspecific retail point of sale terminals to interact with the system.

The BIA/Retail interface is designed to allow the terminal to performthe following operation:

Commercial Transaction

List Accounts

In order to implement those operations, the BIA/Retail provides thefollowing command set:

Set Language <language-name>

Get Biometric <time>

Get PIN <time>

Assign Register <register> <value>

Get Account index code <time>

Validate Amount <amount> <time>

Enter Amount <time>

Form Message <type>

Show Response <encrypted response> <time>

Reset

1.3.2. BIA Software: CATV (Integrated Remote) Command Set

The BIA/CATV software interface exports a command set that allowsterminals integrated with a Phone/CATV BIAs to interact with the system.The following operation is supported:

Remote Commercial Transaction

List Accounts

In order to implement that operation, the BIA/CATV provides thefollowing command set:

Get Biometric <time>

Set PIN <text>

Assign Register <register> <text>

Set Account index code <text>

Form Message <type>

Decrypt Response <encrypted response message>

Reset

1.3.3. BIA Software: Registration Command Set

The BIA/Reg software interface exports an interface that allowsgeneral-purpose computers to interact with the system to identify andregister buyers. The following operations are supported:

Buyer Identification

Buyer Registration

List Accounts

In order to support those operations, the BIA/Reg provides the followingcommand set:

Set Language <language-name>

Get Biometric <time> primary|secondary!

Get PIN <time>

Assign Register <register> <text>

Get Message Key

Form Message <type>

Show Response <encrypted response> <time>

Reset

1.3.4. BIA Software: PC Command Set

The BIA/PC software interface exports a command set that allowsgeneral-purpose computers to conduct transactions across the network.The following operations are supported:

Remote Commercial Transaction

List Accounts

In order to support those operations, the BIA/PC provides the followingcommand set:

Set Language <language-name>

Get Biometric <time>

Get PIN <time>

Get Account index code <time>

Validate Amount <amount> <time>

Enter Amount <time>

Assign Register <register> <text>

Get Message Key

Form Message <type>

Show Response <encrypted response> <time>

Reset

1.3.5. BIA Software: Issuer Command Set

The BIA/Iss software interface exports an interface that allowsgeneral-purpose computers to interact with the system to authenticateand submit batch change requests. The following operation is supported:

Issuer Batch

In order to implement this operation, the BIA/Iss provides the followingcommand set:

Set Language <language-name>

Get Biometric <time> primary|secondary!

Get PIN <time>

Assign Register <register> <value>

Get Message Key

Form Message <type>

Show Response <encrypted response> <time>

Reset

1.3.7. BIA Software: internal Command Set

The BIA/Int exports a command set that allows general-purpose computersto interact with the system to identify people for purposes of customersupport terminals. The following operation is supported:

Buyer Identification

In order to implement this operation, the BIA/Int provides the followingcommand set:

Set Language <language-name>

Get Biometric <time>

Get PIN <time>

Assign Register <register> <value>

Get Message Key

Form Message <type>

Show Response <encrypted response> <time>

Reset

1.4. Terminals 1.4.1. Introduction

The terminal is the device that controls the BIA and connects to the DPCvia modem, X.25 packet network, telephone network, the Internet, aprivate intranet, or even a Cable TV network, or some other mechanismfor digital networking that is well-known in the industry. Terminalscome in different shapes and sizes, and require different versions ofthe BIA to perform their tasks. Any electronic device that can issuecommands to and receive results from the biometric input device isconsidered to be a terminal.

Some terminals are application programs that run on a general-purposemicrocomputer, while other terminals are combinations of special-purposehardware and software as show in FIG. 1.

While the terminal is critical for the functioning of the system as awhole, the system itself places no trust in the terminal whatsoever.Whenever a terminal provides information to the system, the systemalways validates it in some manner, either through presentation to thebuyer for confirmation, or by cross-checking through other previouslyregistered information.

While terminals are able to read some parts of BIA messages in order tovalidate that the data was processed properly by the BIA, terminalscannot read biometric identification information including thebiometric, the PIN, encryption keys, or account index codes.

Specific BIAs export some security functionality to the terminal, suchas PIN entry, and private code display. As a result, such devices areregarded as somewhat less secure than their entirely self-containedcounterparts, and as such have consequently lower security ratings.

There are many different terminal types; each is connected to a specificmodel BIA. Each terminal is described in brief below:

BRT (Buyer Registration Terminal)

Standard BIA with Registration software load attached to a microcomputerprovides issuers with the ability to register new buyers with the systemalong with their financial accounts and other personal information.

CPT (Cable-TV Point of Sale Terminal)

BIA/catv with CATV software load attached to the CATV broadband providesbuyers with biometric-television (or "TV") remotes with the ability toauthorize television shopping purchases.

CST (Customer Service Terminal)

Standard BIA with Internal software load attached to a microcomputersystem authorizes employees to construct database requests for thepurposes of customer service.

IPT (Internet Point of Sale Terminal)

Standard BIA with personal computer software load attached to amicrocomputer provides buyers with Internet connections the ability topurchase products from a seller that is connected to the Internet.

IT (Issuer Terminal)

Standard BIA with Issuer software load attached to a microcomputerprovides issuerss with the ability to send batched changes of financialaccounts to the DPC.

PPT (Phone Point of Sale Terminal)

BIA/catv with CATV software load integrated with a telephone providesbuyers with the ability to authorize transactions over the telephone.

RPT (Retail Point of Sale Terminal)

Standard BIA with Retail software load attached to an X.25 network orusing a modem allows a buyer to purchase items using commercialtransactions in a store.

1.4.2. Terminal: Retail Point of Sale Terminal 1.4.2.1. Purpose

The purpose of the RPT is to allow buyers to purchase items at a storewithout having to use either cash, check, or a debit or credit card.

The RPT uses a BIA/Retail to authorize financial transactions from abuyer to a seller. In addition to being used to accept biometric-PINauthorizations, the RPT provides standard debit and credit card scanningfunctions as well.

Note that only the biometric-related transactions are described indetail here. It is assumed that the RPT may also consist of standardcredit and debit magnetic stripe card readers, as well as optional smartcard readers too. An example of a RPT is a Verifone Tranz/330.

1.4.2.2. Construction

Each RPT is connected to the DPC by a modem, an X.25 network connection,an ISDN connection, or similar mechanism. The RPT may also be connectedto other devices, such as an electronic cash register, from which itobtains the amount of the transaction and the seller identificationcode.

The RPT consists of:

a BIA/Retail

an inexpensive microprocessor

modem or network interface hardware

seller identification code number in non-volatile RAM

a serial port for connecting to the BIA

magnetic stripe card reader (known in the industry)

ECR (electronic cash register) connection port

optional smart card reader (known in the industry)

1.4.2.3. Identification

Two entities need to be identified for the DPC to respond positively toa BIA commercial transaction message: the buyer and the seller.

The buyer is identified by the biometric-PIN, and the seller isidentified by the DPC, which cross-checks the seller identification codecontained in the BIA's VAD record with the seller identification codeadded to the transaction request by the RPT.

1.4.2.4. Operation

First, the seller enters the value of the transaction into hiselectronic cash register. This information is communicated to the BIA,along with the list of goods or services, date and time, any invoicenumbers, the location, and the seller identification code. Thisrepresents the proposed commercial transaction. If the buyer approves,he either enters the amount or validates the amount, possibly asking forcash back, and then enters his biometric-PIN as well as his accountindex code. When the buyer completes his approval, the RPT instructs theBIA to construct the commercial transaction, and then sends thecommercial transaction to the DPC through its network connection (modem,X.25, etc.).

When the DPC receives the transaction, it validates the biometric-PIN,obtains the account number using the index code, and cross-checks theseller identification code in the message with the registered owner ofthe BIA. If everything checks out, the DPC forms and sends acredit/debit transaction to execute the exchange, assuming thecommercial transaction is to happen immediately. The response from thecredit/debit network is added to the private code to form thetransaction response message, which the DPC then sends back to the RPT.The RPT examines the response to see whether or not the transactionsucceeded, and then forwards the response to the BIA, which thendisplays the buyer's private code, concluding the transaction.

1.4.2.5. Security

Messages between the RPT and the DPC are secured by encryption and MACcalculation from the BIA. The MAC allows the RPT to review theunencrypted parts of the message, but the RPT cannot change them.Encryption prevents the encrypted part of the message from beingdisclosed to the RPT.

Each retail BIA must be registered to a seller. This helps to discourageBIA theft. Furthermore, because the RPT adds the seller identificationcode onto each message, replacing a seller's BIA with a different BIA isdetected by the cross-check performed at the DPC.

1.4.3. Terminal: Internet Point of Sale Terminal 1.4.3.1. Purpose

The purpose of an Internet Point of sale Terminal (IPT) is to authorizecredit and debit financial transactions from a buyer at a computer to aseller, both of whom are on the Internet.

Note that the Internet simply represents a general-purpose network wherea seller, the DPC, and the IPT can all connect to each other in realtime. As a result, this mechanism would work exactly the same on anyother general-purpose network or collection of interconnectedgeneral-purpose networks.

1.4.3.2. Construction

The IPT consists of:

a BIA/PC

a microcomputer

an Internet Shopper software application

an Internet (or other network) connection

1.4.3.3. Identification

In addition to identifying the buyer, the IPT must also identify theremote seller who is the counterparty to the transaction. The sellermust also identify both the DPC and the IPT.

The Internet Shopper program stores the hostname (or other form of netname) of the seller from which the purchase is taking place so that theDPC can verify the seller's identity. This is called the seller'sidentification channel. Since the seller registers all of his legitimateInternet hosts with the DPC, this allows the DPC to cross-check theseller identification code with the seller identification code storedunder that hostname to verify the seller's identity.

1.4.3.4. Operation

First, the IPT connects to the seller using the Internet. Once aconnection is established, the IPT secures it by generating and thensending a Session Key to the seller. In order to assure that the sessionkey is protected from disclosure, it is encrypted with the seller'sPublic Key using Public Key Encryption. When the seller receives thisencrypted Session Key, he decrypts it using his Private Key. Thisprocess is called securing a connection through a Public Key Encryptedsecret key exchange.

Once connected, the IPT downloads the seller identification code, andboth price and product information from the seller. Once the buyer isready to make a purchase, he selects the merchandise he wishes to buy.Then, the buyer enters the biometric-PIN using the BIA/PC, the IPT sendsthe seller identification code, the product identification information,and the amount to the BIA, and instructs it to construct a RemoteCommercial Transaction message. Then the IPT sends the request to theseller via the secure channel.

The seller is connected to the DPC via the same sort of secureconnection that the IPT has with the seller, namely, using Public KeyEncryption to send a secure session key. Unlike the IPT-sellerconnection, however, seller-DPC session keys are good for an entire day,not for just one connection.

The seller connects to the DPC, securing the connection using thesession key, forwarding the transaction to the DPC for validation. TheDPC validates the biometric-PIN, cross-checks the seller identificationcode contained in the request with the seller identification code storedunder the hostname that was sent in the request, and then sends atransaction to the credit/debit network. Once the credit/debit networkresponds, the DPC constructs a response message including thecredit/debit authorization, an encrypted private code, and the addressof the buyer, and sends that message back to the seller.

Once the seller receives the response, it copies the buyer's mailingaddress out of the response, makes note of the authorization code, andforwards the response message to the IPT.

The IPT hands the response to the BIA, which decrypts the private codeand displays it on the LCD screen, indicating that the DPC recognizedthe buyer. The IPT also shows the result of the transaction as well, beit success or failure.

1.4.3.5. Security

Since the system in general assumes that an adversary inhabiting thenetwork can hijack network connections at any point, all parties musthave secure communications during their real-time interactions. The mainconcern isn't disclosure of information, but rather insertion orredirection of messages.

The whole system of Public Key Encryption relies on having a trustedsource for the Public Keys. These trusted sources are called CertifyingAuthorities, one of which is the company VeriSign, Inc.

1.4.4. Terminal: Buyer Registration Terminal 1.4.4.1. Purpose

The purpose of the Buyer Registration Terminal (BRT) is to register newbuyers including their biometric-PIN, mailing address, private code, anda list of financial accounts and account index codes that they canaccess, all using their biometric-PIN.

The objective of the enrollment process is to obtain personalinformation from a buyer at the location of a responsible institutionwhere that information can be validated. This includes, but is notlimited to retail banking outlets and credit card issuers. Eachparticipating responsible institution has one or more BRTs that are usedby employees who have been authorized to perform registrations. Eachemployee is accountable for each buyer registered.

1.4.4.2. Construction

The BRT consists of:

an microcomputer and screen, keyboard, mouse

a BIA/Reg

a modem or network connection

a buyer registration software application

The BRT uses an attached BIA/Reg for biometric entry, and is connectedto the system by a modem or a network connection. Buyer RegistrationTerminals are located in places that are physically secure such asretail banking outlets.

1.4.4.3. Identification

Three entities need to be identified for the DPC to respond positivelyto a BIA/Reg registration message: the registering employee, theinstitution, and the BIA/Reg. The employee must have been authorized toregister buyers for that institution.

The institution and the BIA are identified by cross-checking the ownerof the BIA with the institution code set by the BRT. The employeeidentifies himself to the system by entering his biometric-PIN uponstarting the registration application.

The institution uses its standard customer identification procedure(signature cards, employee records, personal information, etc.) beforeregistering the buyer on the system. It is important for the institutionto verify buyer identity as assiduously as possible, since theregistering buyer will be empowered to make purchases and transfer moneyfrom those financial accounts at will.

1.4.4.4. Operation

During registration, the buyer enters both a primary and secondaryregistration biometric sample. The buyer must use both index fingers; ifthe buyer is missing index fingers, the next inner-most finger may beused. Requiring specific fingers to be used (such as the index finger)allows the prior fraud check to work.

The buyer is encouraged to select a primary and a secondary finger; theprimary finger is given preference during the DPC identity check, so thebuyer should present the most-often used finger as the primary. Ofcourse, the DPC could choose to alter the designation of primary andsecondary biometrics based on operations if it turns out to be importantto do so.

As a part of the biometric encoding process, the BIA/R determines if thebuyer has entered "a good print." If a good print is not present, theBIA/R asks the buyer to re-enter the biometric which was determined tobe of poor quality.

The buyer selects a PIN of from four to twelve digits from a series ofPIN options provided by the system's central database. However, the PINmust be validated by the system. This involves two checks: one, that thenumber of other buyers using the same PIN aren't too great (since thePIN is used to reduce the number of buyers checked by the biometriccomparison algorithm), and that the buyer's registration biometricsample being registered isn't too similar to other buyer's biometricsstored within the same PIN group. If either happens, the enrollment isrejected, an error message is returned to the BRT, and the buyer isinstructed to request a different PIN. The system may optionally returnwith an "identical match" error condition, which indicates that thebuyer already has a record in the system under that PIN.

A PIN of 0 allows the system to assign a PIN to the buyer.

The buyer constructs a confidential private code consisting of a word orphrase. If the buyer does not wish to construct one, a private code willbe constructed randomly by the terminal.

The buyer may also arrange their financial account code list. This listdescribes which account index code points at which account (e.g. 1 fordebit, 2 for credit, 3 for emergency account index code linked to debit,etc.). For checking and savings accounts, the registering institutionmust be the bank or financial institution that provides the accounts.The buyer signs an agreement allowing the system to authorize financialtransactions on their behalf when they present their biometric-PIN.

Even after registration, a buyer is not actually able to performoperations using the system until a prior fraud buyer re-registrationcheck is completed. This generally takes a few minutes, but during timesof high load, it takes up to several hours. Only if the system finds noinstance of prior fraud is the buyer's access activated.

In an alternate embodiment, relatively low security registrations areaccomplished at places such as supermarkets, over the Internet, or atunattended kiosks. Registrations at such places must be subsequentlyconfirmed by a telephone call to the registering buyer using a telephonenumber gathered from credit or bank account records, or by sending aletter to the registering buyer's mailing address (also gathered frombank or credit account records) requiring him to call back and confirmthe registration. The ability to authorize transactions will only beenabled once registration is confirmed.

If a financial account number is registered without the participation ofthe issuing institution, the financial account owner must sign anagreement at the time of registration authorizing the release of fundswhenever a transaction is received by the system that is properlyauthorized using his biometric and PIN. Of course, confirmation ofidentity is still required to validate the signature, either through atelephone contact or an in-person examination of the registrant'sidentity documents. This confirmation is required in order to preventbuyers from registering other people's financial account numbers undertheir own biometric and PIN.

If a buyer does manage to register another buyer's financial accountsand make use of them for a period of time, once detected, the buyer'sability to authorize transactions will be disabled, and the buyer willbe added to the prior fraud database preventing the buyer fromre-registering until the matter is cleared up.

1.4.4.5. Security

If a buyer is found to have defrauded the system, the DPC institutes adatabase-wide involuntary biometric database search for the buyer.Several of these are performed each night, so buyers who areparticularly wanted by the system can thus be winnowed out of thedatabase by using a time consuming process during conditions of lightactivity.

The employees performing the registration operation identify themselvesusing biometric-PIN only when initially activating the registrationsystem. This is a convenience for the employee, but a possible securityproblem for the system, as unattended or "temporarily borrowed" BRTscould be the source for fraud. As a result, the registration applicationexits after a predetermined period of no activity.

1.4.5. Terminal: Customer Service 1.4.5.1. Purpose

The purpose of the customer service terminal (CST) is to provideinternal DPC support personnel access to the various aspects of thesystem databases. Support people need to answer inquiries by buyers,issuers, institutions, and sellers that are having trouble with thesystem, as well as registering new sellers with the system Buyers maywish to change mailing information, or even their PIN.

1.4.5.2. Construction

The CST consists of:

a microcomputer

a BIA/Int

ethernet/token ring/FDDI network interface

a database examination and modification application

Each CST is connected to the system via a high speed local area networkconnection such as token ring, Ethernet, fiber (FDDI), etc. Each CST hasthe capability to query each of the databases, and display the resultsof these queries. However, the CST only displays fields and recordsbased on the privilege of the terminal user. For instance, a standardcustomer service employee won't be able to see the encryption code for agiven BIA's VDB record, though they can see who currently owns that BIA.

1.4.5.3. Identification

For the CST to allow access to the database, the user and the BIA mustbe identified by the system. In addition, the employee's privilege levelmust also be determined, so that the database can restrict accessappropriately.

1.4.5.4. Operation

An employee using a CST starts a session by providing identification byentering their biometric-PIN. The BIA constructs an IdentificationRequest message, and send it to the DPC for verification. Once thesystem verifies the employee, the CST application can operate normally,though limited by the employee's previously assigned DPC privilegelevel.

1.4.5.5. Security

For security purposes, the DPC will terminate a connection to the CSTapplication after a predetermined idle time period.

It is important that the database application cannot be modified in anymanner; either deliberately, or through an unintentional introduction ofa virus. To that end, CSTs do not have any floppy drives or otherremovable media. Furthermore, read access to the database applicationexecutable is strictly limited to those with a need to know.

In order to protect the communications between the CST and the databasefrom surreptitious modification or disclosure, the CST encrypts alltraffic between the CST and the database. To do this, the CST generatesa session key that is sent to the server during the login session withthe system. This session key is used to encrypt and decrypt allcommunications with the DPC that occur during the period.

Even assuming secure communications and no modified databaseapplications, the DPC makes certain that DPC data fields that are notaccessible to the individual operating the CST are not sent to the CST'sdatabase application. Likewise, at no time do any CST personnel haveaccess to or permission to modify buyer biometric information.

The DPC and the support center can be co-located, or because of thefairly tight security surrounding the CST itself, the support center canbe split off on its own.

1.4.6. Terminal: Issuer Terminal 1.4.6.1. Purpose

The purpose of the issuer terminal is to allow employees at issuingbanks to submit batch financial account modification operations to theDPC in a secure and identifiable manner.

1.4.6.2. Construction

The IT consists of:

a microcomputer

a modem, X.25 network, or Internet connection to the system

a BlA/Iss

a network connection to the bank's internal network

The Issuer Terminal uses an issuer BIA to authorize mass additions anddeletions of financial account information.

1.4.6.3. Identification

In this operation, the bank must be identified, a properly-authorizedbank employee must be identified, and all of the buyers whose financialaccounts are being added or removed must also be identified.

The bank is responsible for identifying the buyers who wish to add theirfinancial accounts at that bank to their financial account list. As inbuyer registration, this is done by the bank using signature cards andpersonal information. The DPC identifies the bank by cross-checking theissuer code submitted by the IT with the issuer code registered in theVAD record of the BIA/Iss. A biometric-PIN is used to identify the bankemployee actually submitting the batch.

1.4.6.4. Operation

In order to add a financial account, a buyer gives his biometricidentification number to the bank (the identification number is given tothe buyer during the initial buyer registration step) along with thefinancial accounts that are to be added. After the buyer is properlyidentified, this identification code and financial account list areforwarded to the IT for subsequent batch submission to the system.

Whenever deemed appropriate by the bank, an authorized employee at thebank instructs the IT to upload the batched financial accountadditions/deletions to the DPC. To do this, the authorized employeeenters his biometric-PIN, the IT adds a session key, adds the bank'sissuer code, and from that the BIA/Iss constructs an Issuer Batchmessage that the IT then forwards to the DPC. The IT encrypts the batchusing the message code, and then sends that as well.

When the system receives the Issuer Batch, it validates that the BIA isa BIA/Iss, that the BIA/Iss is registered to the bank claimed by theissuer code, and that the employee identified in the biometric-PIN isallowed to submit batch requests to the DPC for that bank. If so, theDPC processes all the requests, keeping track of errors as required.Once done, the DPC returns the employee's private code, along with anencrypted batch containing any errors that occurred during processing.

1.4.6.5. Security

Securing this transaction is critical for the security of the system. Acriminal intent on fraud need only find a way to add other people'sfinancial accounts to his biometric identification code and can thencommit fraud at will. Eventually the criminal is caught, and purged fromthe database, but only after other people's financial accounts aredrained by the criminal.

Encryption guarantees that the transmission between bank and DPC cannotbe intercepted, and thus financial account numbers are protected intransit.

Cross-checking the bank with the BIA/Iss means that both the IT and theBIA must be compromised to submit false add/delete messages to the DPC.Thus, the bank must ensure that the IT is physically secure, and thatonly authorized employees are allowed to access it.

Requiring an employee to submit the batch ensures that a responsibleemployee is "in the loop" to make sure that proper bank securitymeasures have been followed in the construction and submission of thebatch.

1.4.7. Terminal: Phone Point of Sale Terminal 1.4.7.1. Purpose

The purpose of the phone point of sale terminal (PPT) is to authorizecredit or debit financial transactions from a buyer using aspecially-equipped telephone to make a purchase from a seller, or payfor a telephone call.

1.4.7.2. Construction

The PPT consists of:

a BIA/catv

a VoiceView-equipped rapid-connect digital modem

a telephone (keypad, earpiece, microphone)

a microprocessor

a DSP (digital signal processor)

a standard telephone line

The PPT accepts biometric identification using a BIA/Catv connected toand integrated with a cordless, cellular, or standard telephone.

1.4.7.3. Identification

In order for the DPC to authorize a transaction, both the buyer and theseller must be identified.

To identify a buyer, biometric-PIN identification is used.

To identify a phone-order seller, the seller and all his phone numbersthat buyers will call are registered with the DPC. Thus when a buyersubmits an authorization, he also submits the phone number he called,which is then cross-checked with the seller's listed phone numbers.

1.4.7.4. Operation

Buyers call sellers that are selling their wares through paper catalogs,newspapers, magazines, or other basic print media mechanisms. The PPTuses a special modem that shares the telephone voice line to exchangedigital information with the seller.

Each time the buyer makes a phone call, the PPT keeps track of the phonenumber that was typed by the user, in case the buyer decides to make apurchase. A DSP is used to detect dialtone, ring, connection, and so on,in order to tell what the actual phone number entered was, as distinctfrom extensions, or the navigation of phone message systems, and so on.

Once a call is placed to a seller, the salesman for the seller digitallydownloads all the relevant information to the PPT including product,price, and the seller identification code. Note that when in operation,the modem disconnects the speaker.

When the product information is downloaded, the PPT then prompts thebuyer for the biometric-PIN, the account index code, and then asks thebuyer to validate the purchase amount. Then the phone number and theseller identification code are added, and the message is encrypted. Therapid-connect modem is again engaged to send the authorizationinformation to the seller.

When the seller receives the authorization information, the sellerverifies that the price and product information are correct, and thenforwards the transaction to the DPC using a secured communicationschannel using either the Internet or some other general-purpose network.The connection to the DPC is secured using Public Key Encryption and asecret key exchange.

Upon receiving and decrypting a phone authorization, the DPC checks thephone number against the seller identification code, validates thebiometric-PIN, and then sends the transaction to the credit/debitnetwork for authorization. If authorization succeeds, the DPC appendsthe buyer's address to the response message and sends the response tothe seller.

The seller receives the response from the DPC, copies the mailingaddress, and forwards the message to the buyer again via a brief sessionwith the rapid-connect modem. When the transmission to the IPT iscomplete, a chime sounds, the modem disconnects, and the buyer's privatecode (decrypted by the BIA) is displayed on the LCD screen. The seller'ssales rep confirms that the buyer's mailing address is valid; if so, thecall is terminated and the transaction is complete.

1.4.7.5. Security

One of the security concerns about phone transactions is the security ofthe phone system itself. Apart from the biometric identification, thecentral problem is making sure that the number the buyer called actuallyreaches the seller in question.

Note that the communications link between the PPT and the seller isn'tsecured, so a purchase authorization from a buyer to a seller could beintercepted. However, no financial benefit would result from this, so itis not deemed to be important.

The security of a PPT is relatively low by necessity of price, weight,and because of the problems inherent in splitting the responsibility ofPIN entry and private code decryption and presentation.

1.4.8. Terminal: Cable-TV Point of Sale 1.4.8.1. Purpose

The purpose of the CATV point of sale terminal (CPT) is to authorizecredit or debit financial transactions from a buyer in front of histelevision (or "TV") set to a seller who is presenting objects for saleon television.

1.4.8.2. Construction

The CPT consists of:

a BIA/catv

a television remote control with integrated BIA/catv

a Cable-TV digital signal decoder

a Cable-TV remote control reader

an on-screen display mechanism

access to a Cable-TV broadband two-way communications channel

The CPT accepts biometric identification using a BIA/catv that isintegrated with the television's remote control device. The remotecontrol communicates with a television top box that itself communicateswith the broadband cable television network. The terminal consists ofthe television remote logic that communicates with the BIA, as well asthe television top box that communicates over the cable broadbandnetwork.

1.4.8.3. Identification

In this transaction, the seller and the buyer must both be identified toexecute the transaction.

The buyer is identified by the biometric-PIN.

The seller is identified by a seller credential, created by the CATVbroadcaster at the time the product is shown on television. Each productbroadcast has a seller-product credential consisting of a selleridentification code, a time, a duration, and a price which is signedusing Public Key Encryption and the CATV network broadcaster's privatekey. This seller-product credential can only be generated by the networkbroadcaster.

1.4.8.4. Operation

As a television advertisement, an infomercial, or a home shoppingchannel displays a product, the Cable television network also broadcastssimultaneous digital information that describes a short description,price, as well as the seller-product credential. This digitalinformation is processed and temporarily stored by the CPT, ready to beaccessed by the buyer when a decision to purchase is made.

To buy something that is currently being displayed, the buyer selectsthe on-screen display function of the special television Remote, whichinstructs the CPT to display text information on the screen regardingthe currently viewed product.

The buyer is first prompted for the number of the items he wishes to buythrough the on-screen display. Then he is prompted to enter hisBiometric-PIN, and his account index code. Once he verifies that thefinal purchase price is okay, the product, price, seller identificationcode, seller-product credential, and channel number along with theBiometric-PIN are used to construct a Commercial Transaction message.The request is sent to the seller for authorization by way of theCable-television broadband two-way communications channel.

Note that each seller that desires to sell products in this manner musthave the ability to receive order information using the broadband Cabletelevision network.

Upon receipt of the authorization request, the seller submits it to theDPC using a secured Internet connection or an X.25 connection.

If the DPC authorizes the transaction, it constructs an authorizationresponse that includes the current mailing address of the buyer inaddition to the authorization code, and the encrypted private code. Oncethe seller receives the authorization, he copies the authorization andthe mailing address, and then forwards the authorization back to theCPT, who then displays the private code to the buyer, terminating thetransaction.

1.4.8.5. Security

This architecture does not allow criminals to replay messagesintercepted from the CableTV broadband, but they are able to read partsof them. If this is not desirable, then the messages may be encryptedusing an optional CATV Center's public key, or other "link level"encryption between the CATV set-top box and the CATV local office.

To secure a connection between a seller and the DPC, the connection usesa session key changed daily that has been previously exchanged using apublic key encryption key exchange system.

1.5.1. Introduction

The Data Processing Center (DPC) handles financial commercialtransactions and buyer registration as its main responsibilities.

Each DPC site is made up of a number of computers and databasesconnected together over a LAN as illustrated in the DPC Overview FIG.#2. Multiple identical DPC sites ensure reliable service in the face ofdisaster or serious hardware failure at any single DPC site.Furthermore, each DPC site has electrical power backup and multipleredundancy in all of its critical hardware and database systems.

DPC components fall into three categories: hardware, software, anddatabases. Below is a short description, by category, of each component.More detailed descriptions appear in the following sections.

1.5.1.1. Hardware

FW

Firewall Machine: the entry point of the DPC site.

GM

Gateway Machine: the system coordinator and message processor.

DPCLAN

DPC Local Area Network: connects the DPC sites

1.5.1.2. Databases

IBD

Individual Biometric Database: identifies buyers from their biometricand PIN code.

PFD

Prior Fraud Database: lists buyers who have defrauded the system and cancheck if a biometric matches any of these buyers.

VAD

Valid Apparatus Database: stores information required to validate anddecrypt BIA messages.

AOD

Apparatus Owner Database: stores information about the owners of BIAdevices.

ID

Issuer Database: identifies issuing banks that participate with thesystem.

AID

Authorized Individual Database: stores the list of people allowed to usepersonal or issuer BIA devices.

RSD

Remote Seller Database: stores information necessary to processtransactions with telephone and cable television sellers.

1.5.1.3. Software

MPM

Message Processing Module: handles the processing of each message bycoordinating with the other software modules and databases required toperform the message's task.

SNM

Sequence Number Module: handles DUKPT sequence number processing.

MACM

Message Authentication Code Module: handles MAC validation andgeneration.

MDM

Message Decrypt Module: handles encrypting and decrypting of BIArequests and responses.

PGL

PIN Group List: handles the lookup of PIN groups by PIN and theconfiguration of database elements that depend on the list of PINgroups.

IML

IBD Machine List: handles the lookup of the main and backup databasemachines dedicated to holding IBD records for a given PIN group.

1.5.1.4. Terminology

When defining database schema, the following terminology is used fordescribing field types:

    ______________________________________    int<X>     an integral type using <X> bytes of storage    char<X>    a character array of <X> bytes    text       a variable length character array    <type > X! a length <X> array of the specified type    time       a type used for storing time and date    biometric  a binary data type used for storing the biometric    ______________________________________

When describing database storage requirements, the term "expected" meansthe expected condition of a fully loaded system.

1.5.2. Protocol Description

Terminals accomplish their tasks by sending messages to a DPC site. TheDPC site sends back a response packet containing the status on thesuccess or failure of the operation.

Communication is via a logical or a physical connection-oriented messagedelivery mechanism such as X.25 connections, TCP/IP connections, or atelephone call to a modem bank. Each session holds the connection to theterminal open until the DPC sends its response back to the terminal.

The message contains a BIA message part and a terminal message part:

BIA message part

protocol version number

message type

4-byte BIA Identification

4-byte sequence number

<message specific data>

Message Authentication Code (MAC)

Terminal message part

<terminal specific data>

The BIA message part is constructed by a BIA device. It includes one ortwo biometrics, a PIN, authorization amounts, and the contents of thegeneral registers which are set by the terminal. Note: the MAC in theBIA message part only applies to the BIA part and not to the terminalpart.

A terminal may place additional data for the message in the terminalmessage part. The BIA provides a message key to allow the terminal tosecure the terminal part data. The BIA automatically includes themessage key in the packet's encrypted biometric-PIN block whennecessary. The terminal performs the message key encryption itself,however.

The response packet contains a standard header and two optionalfree-form message parts: one with a MAC and one without:

Standard Header

protocol version number

message type

<message specific data>

MAC

Optional Free-form message part without MAC

<additional message specific data>

The message part with a MAC is sent to the BIA so that it may validatethat this part of the response has not been tampered with and to displaythe buyer's private code. The message part without a MAC is used fortransmitting large amounts of data that are not sent to the BIA for MACvalidation as the BIA to terminal connection may be of limitedbandwidth.

1.5.3. Processing Packets

In an embodiment of the invention with multiple DPC sites, a terminalneed only send its message to one of the DPC sites, typically theclosest, because that site automatically handles updating the others byrunning distributed transactions as necessary.

When one of the DPC's Firewall Machines receives a packet, it forwardsit to one of the GM Machines for the actual processing. Each GM has aMessage Processing Module that handles the coordination between the DPCcomponents required to process the message and sends the response backto the sender.

1.5.4. Validating and Decrypting Packets

All packets the DPC receives, with the exception of those notconstructed by a BIA, contain a BIA hardware identification code (theBIA Identification of the packet), a sequence number, and a MessageAuthentication Code (MAC). The GM asks the MAC Module to validate thepacket's MAC and then checks the sequence number with the SequenceNumber Module. If both check out, the GM passes the packet to theMessage Decrypt Module for decryption. If any one of the checks fail,the GM logs a warning, terminates processing for the packet, and returnsan error message to the BIA device.

1.5.5. Response Packets

Each packet the DPC receives may contain an optional response key storedin the encrypted biometric-PIN block of the packet. Before the DPCreplies to a message that includes a response key, it encrypts theresponse packet with the response key. It also generates a MessageAuthentication Code and appends it to the packet.

The only exception to encrypting response packets applies to errormessages. Errors are never encrypted and never include confidentialinformation. However, most response packets include a status or responsecode that can indicate whether the request succeeded or not. Forexample, when the DPC declines a credit authorization, it does notreturn an error packet, it returns a normal transaction response packetwith a response code set to "failed".

1.5.6. DPC Procedures

The DPC has three procedures commonly used while processing messages.

1.5.6.1. Buyer Identification Procedure

For messages that require the DPC to identify a buyer, the DPC executesthe following procedure using the personal authentication information inthe message (the bid biometric and the PIN): using the PIN code, the DPCsearches the IBD Machine List for the main and backup IBD machinesresponsible for handling identifications for the given PIN code. Next,the DPC sends the identification message to either the main or backupmachines depending on which is the least loaded. The IBD machineresponds with the IBD record for the buyer or a "buyer not found" error.

The IBD machine retrieves all the IBD records for the given PIN. Using aproprietary biometric hardware device, the IBD machine compares eachrecord's primary registered biometric sample with the buyer's bidbiometric sample arriving at a comparison score indicating thesimilarity of the two biometrics. If no biometric has a close enoughcomparison score, the comparisons are repeated using the registeredsecondary biometric samples. If none of the secondary biometric have aclose enough comparison score, then the IBD machine returns an "buyernot found" error. Otherwise, the IBD machine returns the full IBD recordof the buyer, from which such fields such as the private code, financialaccount numbers, and so on may be obtained.

The IBD machine maintains a circular queue of the most recentlysubmitted bid biometric samples for each IBD record. If a bid biometricsample exactly matches a sample on the queue, the DPC can assume thatthe buyer's biometric sample may have been stolen. If this happensrepeatedly, the DPC will suspend the buyer's ability to authorizetransactions and generate a security violation message. When contact ismade with the buyer, the DPC will allow the buyer to select a new PIN,thus resolving the issue.

1.5.6.2. Silent Alarm Procedure

For messages that include an account index code, the DPC handles thecase where the buyer chooses his or her emergency account index code.The GM processing the message immediately logs a warning, and if theresponse packet has a response code and the IBD silent alarm procedurecode instructs it to forward the silent alarm to the seller, sets theresponse code to "silent alarm".

Other behavior during a silent alarm is governed by the IBD record'ssilent alarm code field. This includes forwarding silent alarms to localauthorities, rejecting transactions over a particular amount, orrejecting transactions altogether. The DPC also increments the silentalarm use count of the buyer's IBD record whenever the emergency accountindex code is used.

It is the responsibility of the owner of the BIA device that submittedthe message to watch for an "silent alarm" response code and providefurther action.

1.5.6.3 Security Factor Module

Before each message can be executed, the DPC performs a security factorassessment on the message to determine if the message has a highprobability of having been fraudulently generated.

Each entry in the VAD has information on the number of recent messagessubmitted, the number of recent messages that have failed, the devicesecurity assessment, whether or not the device is attended along withthe fraud detection skill of the attendant, and lastly the securityproblems associated with the physical location of the device itself(i.e. low or high crime area, etc.). The local time of day is also addedinto the equation. If the message is a commercial transaction, thedollar value of the transaction is also applied as a modifier. Otherfactors can be added as necessary. The result of the calculation is anumber indicating the relative confidence that the transaction islegitimate.

Once the security factors assessment is done, transactions that arerated below a particular value are rejected as possible securityproblems, while transactions that are rated below a second and lowervalue are rejected as probable violations, the transaction is noted inthe DPC security log.

Whenever a buyer identification fails, the VAD record for the device isupdated appropriately. Too many failures, and the Security Factor Modulewill take the device out of service, refusing any further transactionsfrom that device until a service representative places it back inservice.

1.5.7. Protocol Messages

The following sections describe each protocol message/response and theactions the DPC takes to perform them.

The list of protocol packets are:

Buyer Identification

Commercial Transaction

Registration

Issuer Batch

List Accounts

1.5.7.1. Buyer Identification

Buyer Identification Message

BIA Part:

4-byte BIA Identification

4-byte sequence number

encrypted (DUKPT key) Biometric-PIN block:

300-byte authorization biometric

4-12 digit PIN

112-bit response key

MAC

Terminal Part: (not used)

Buyer Identification Response

encrypted (response key):

private code text

buyer name

biometric identification code

status code (ok, failed, etc.)

MAC

The Buyer Identification message includes a biometric-PIN block whichthe DPC uses with the buyer identification procedure to identify thebuyer. If the buyer is identified, then the DPC responds with thebuyer's name, biometric identification, and private code. Otherwise, theDPC responds with an "unknown buyer" error.

1.5.7.2. Commercial Transaction

Commercial Transaction Message

BIA Part:

4-byte BIA Identification

4-byte sequence number

encrypted (DUKPT key) Biometric-PIN block:

300-byte authorization biometric

4-12 digit PIN

112-bit response key

optional 112-bit message key!

account index code

price

seller identification code

transaction type

optional free-format product information!

optional seller identification channel (phone number, channelnumber+time, hostname)!

optional send-address request!

MAC

Terminal Part: (not used)

Commercial Transaction Response

encrypted (response key):

private code text

authorization response

authorization detail (authorization code, transaction identification,etc)

optional buyer address information!

status code (OK or fail, silent alarm)

MAC

There are two basic commercial transaction subtypes: retail and remote.

There are two basic transaction types: debit and draft. Drafts returnauthorizations that are subsequently cashed by the seller. No moneychanges hands until the draft is cashed. Most current credit cardtransactions are done via draft. For instance, a deposit charge placedon a credit card by a car rental agency is done using a draft. In oneembodiment, these steps are accomplished using a pair of ISO 8583messages: an authorization message followed by a financial transactionmessage.

Debit transactions result in immediate transfer of money from thebuyer's financial account to the seller's financial account. Note thatdebit transactions can occur on a number of different kinds of financialaccounts, including checking accounts, savings accounts, money marketaccounts, credit accounts, and even phone calling-card accounts. Ifmoney changes hands immediately, the system considers the transactiontype to be debit, regardless of the financial account type used as thesource of funds, or which external computer system is used to move themoney around.

The DPC identifies the buyer by the biometric-PIN block of the message.If the buyer cannot be identified, the DPC replies with an "unknownbuyer" error.

At this point, the DPC executes the actual transaction.

For instance, if the transaction type is a draft, the DPC constructs acredit authorization draft request and transmits it to the appropriateexternal computer system (e.g. VISANet, MAPP, etc.). The externalcomputer system is responsible, in this embodiment, for performing theresource determination to see if the buyer can pay. If the externalcomputer system approves the transaction, the DPC returns an "OK"response code to the BIA device, while a disapproval results in a"failed" code. The contents of the response message from the externalcomputer system (called an "authorization request response", see ISO8583) are added to the response as well along with the buyer's privatecode.

In an alternate embodiment, the accounts and their balances are storedat the DPC, which performs resource determination, draft generation orcredit/debit instead of sending the transaction to an external computersystem.

When the DPC looks up the buyer's financial account using the accountindex code of the message, the chosen account index code may be theemergency account index code. If this happens, the DPC follows thesilent alarm procedure, which may involve performing the transaction asusual, or performing the transaction with modified credit limits, aswell as notification of authorities.

Remote authorization are generated by telephone, mail order, theInternet, or cable television sellers. The DPC handles remoteauthorizations the same way it does a retail authorization but with thefollowing exceptions:

i) Remote authorizations include a remote seller identification codewhich the DPC checks against the Remote Seller Database to validatewhether the packet's seller Identification matches the one stored in thedatabase. Furthermore, the financial account credited is the remoteseller's financial account, not the financial account of the BIAdevice's owner.

ii) Additionally, BIA devices that generate the remote authorizationstend to be personal BIA devices. The DPC checks the biometricIdentification of the identified buyer against the Authorized IndividualDatabase's list of buyers allowed to use the BIA device. If the buyer isnot authorized to use the device, then the DPC denies the authorizationrequest.

iii) Finally, the authorization packet may contain a "send-address"indicator. This indicator informs the DPC to include the buyer's addressin the response packet and is usually used only for mail orderpurchases.

1.5.7.3. Registration

Registration Message

BIA Part:

4-byte BIA Identification

4-byte sequence number

encrypted (DUKPT key) Biometric-PIN block:

1000-byte primary registration biometric

1000-byte secondary registration biometric

4-12 digit PIN

112-bit response key

112-bit message key

MAC

Terminal Part:

encrypted (message key):

name

address

zipcode

private code

financial account list (account index code, financial account #)

emergency account index code, account index code

silent alarm behavior

Registration Response

encrypted(response key):

private code text

PIN

biometric identification code

list of DPC chosen PINs (if original choice of PIN is rejected)

status code (OK, failed, etc)

MAC

Buyers register with the DPC via a Buyer Registration Terminal (BRT).The BRT sends the DPC a registration packet containing primary andsecondary biometric and personal identification number, along withancillary data such as the buyer's name, address, a list of financialaccounts, the private code, and the emergency account index code.Optionally, the buyer may include a Social Security Number (or "SSN").The buyer may choose his or her own PIN code or allow the system tochoose it. In a modification step any previously entered data can bemodified or deleted.

At any given moment, only one DPC site acts as the registration site,for implementation simplicity. Registration messages received bynon-registration DPC sites are forwarded to the current registrationsite. The registration DPC site performs the entire registration check,assigning of IBD records to IBD machines, and the distributedtransaction required to update all other DPC sites.

The registration DPC site selects the PIN code for registration messagesthat don't specify one, stores the IBD record on the main and backup IBDmachines (as specified in the PIN Group List), and checks the PIN andbiometric suitability of the registration packet before running thedistributed transaction to update the other DPC sites.

The DPC runs a personal identification number and biometric sampleduplication check step wherein the biometric and personal identificationnumber gathered during the registration step is checked against allpreviously registered biometrics currently associated with the identicalpersonal identification number. The DPC may reject the registration forthe following reasons: the PIN code is too popular, or the biometricsare too similar to other biometrics stored under the chosen PIN. To aidthe buyer in choosing an acceptable PIN, the DPC generates a short listof PIN codes for which the registration will be guaranteed that itreserves for a period of time. The BRT then prompts the buyer for a newPIN which may be chosen from the good PIN list.

1.5.7.4. Issuer Batch

Issuer Batch Message

BIA Part:

4-byte BIA Identification

4-byte sequence number

encrypted (DUKPT key) Biometric-PIN block:

300-byte authorization biometric

4-12 digit PIN

112-bit response key

112-bit message key

issuer code

MAC

Terminal Part:

encrypted (message key)

add <biometric Id> <account index code> <financial account> <silentalarm flag>!

remove <biometric Id> <account index code> <financial account>

Issuer Batch Response

encrypted (response key):

private code text

status code (OK, failed, etc.)

MAC

encrypted (message key) failed list:

failed <command> <code>

The Issuer Batch message allows an issuing bank or other authority toperform routine maintenance on the Individual Biometric Database. TheDPC logs a security violation warning if it receives any Issuer Batchmessages from non-issuer BIA devices, and it also refuses to process themessage.

The DPC identifies the employee submitting the batch message byfollowing the buyer identification procedure. The DPC then checks thatthe employee is registered in the Authorized Individual Database to usethe BIA device embedded in the sending Issuer Terminal.

The DPC also uses the issuer code in the message to look up theapparatus owner Identification in the Issuer Database and compare itagainst the apparatus owner Identification stored in the Valid ApparatusDatabase to ensure that the issuer code is not forged.

The DPC then executes the add and delete commands in the message-keyencrypted batch list. The batch list is a newline separated list ofcommands. Valid commands are:

add <biometric Id> <account index code> <financial account> <silentalarm flag>!

The add command adds the financial account to the financial account listat the specified account index code. The optional silent alarm flagindicates whether the particular account index code is treated as thebuyer's emergency account index code. If the financial account currentlystored in the financial account list does not belong to the issuer, thecommand fails. This feature prevents one bank from adding or removingfinancial accounts from other bank's customers without the buyer'sknowledge or authorization.

remove <biometric Id> <account index code> <financial account>

The remove command clears the buyer's financial account stored at thespecified account index code in the financial account list. If thefinancial account currently stored in the financial account list doesnot match the financial account the issuer is attempting to remove, thecommand fails.

For each command in the batch that failed to execute correctly, the GMlogs a security violation warning and appends an entry to the failedlist of the response. The failed entry includes the text for the commandand the error code.

1.5.7.5. List Accounts

List Accounts Message

BIA Part:

4-byte BIA Identification

4-byte sequence number

encrypted (DUKPT key) Biometric-PIN block:

300-byte authorization biometric

4-12 digit PIN

112-bit response key

MAC

Terminal Part: (not used)

List Accounts Response

encrypted (response key):

private code text

list of (account name, account index code)

status code (OK, failed, etc.)

MAC

The list accounts message allows buyers to determine which financialaccounts match particular account index codes. This is useful whenbuyers forget which financial accounts and index codes are available.

The GM identifies the buyer by the packet's biometric-PIN and retrievesthe appropriate information from the buyer's record. Duringregistration, the emergency account index code will be given aninnocuous-sounding name so that criminals cannot determine which accountindex code will trigger the emergency notification.

1.5.8. Customer Support and System Administration Messages

The DPC handles additional message types classified as internalmessages. The DPC generally does not accept these messages from non-DPCsystems. The messages are database vendor specific. However, theinternal network uses DES-encrypted packets to provide additionalsecurity.

The Customer Service and System Administration tasks are implementedusing the database vendor's query language and application developmenttools.

Customer Service tasks

IBD: find, activate, deactivate, remove, correct records, change PINs.

AID: add or remove authorized individuals.

AOD: find, add, remove, correct records.

VAD: find, activate, deactivate, remove, correct records.

RSD: find, add, remove, correct records.

PFD: add, remove, correct records.

System Administration tasks

Run prior fraud checks.

Modify the Valid Site List.

Summarize log information (warnings, errors, etc.).

Modify the PIN Group List.

Performance monitoring.

Run backups.

Crash recovery procedures.

Time synchronization for the DPC sites.

Change the primary registration site.

Change the secret DES encryption key.

Generate a list of BIA hardware identification code, MAC encryption key,and DUKPT Base Key triples. Store on an encrypted floppy for the KeyLoading Device.

1.5.9. Firewall Machine 1.5.9.1. Purpose

The FW Machines provide a first line of defense against network virusesand computer hackers. All communication links into or out of the DPCsite first pass through a secure FW Machine.

1.5.9.2. Usage

The FW Machine, an Internet-localnet router, only handles messagesdestined for the GM Machines.

BIA-equipped terminals send packets to a single DPC site via modem,X.25, or other communication medium. The DPC relies on a third party tosupply the modem banks required to handle the volume of calls and feedthe data onto the DPC backbone.

For DPC to DPC communication, primarily for distributed transactions andsequence number updates, the FW Machines send out double-length DESencrypted packets. The DPC LAN component handles the encryption anddecryption: the FWs do not have the ability to decrypt the packets.

1.5.9.3. Security

A properly configured network sniffer acts as an intruder detector asbackup for the FW. If an anomalous message is detected, the intrudingmessages are recorded in their entirety, an operator is alerted, and theFW is physically shut down by the sniffer.

The FW disallows any transmissions from the internal network to the restof the Internet.

1.5.9.4. Message Bandwidth

A commercial transaction message requires about 400 bytes andregistration packets require about 2 KB. To handle 1000 commercialtransactions per second and 1 registration packet per second, the FWMachines are able to process about 400 KB per second.

Each DPC site requires an aggregate bandwidth of nearly three T1connections to the third party modem bank and the other DPC sites.

1.5.10. Gateway Machine 1.5.10.1. Purpose

The GM Machine (GM), through the FW Machines, link the outside world(BIA-equipped terminals and other DPCs) to the internal components ofthe DPC. The DPC has multiple GMs, typically two.

1.5.10.2. Usage

The GM supervises the processing of each BIA message, communicates withthe various DPC components as necessary, and sends the encrypted resultsof the message back to the sender. The software performing this task iscalled the Message Processing Module.

The GM logs all messages it receives and any warnings from components itcommunicates with. For example, the GM logs any silent alarms, sequencenumber gaps, and invalid packets.

Processing a message may require the GM to inform GMs at all other DPCsof a change in the DPC databases. When this happens, the GM runs adistributed transaction to update the remote databases.

Distributed transactions fall into two categories: synchronous andasynchronous. Synchronous distributed transactions require the GM towait for the distributed transaction to commit before continuing toprocess the packet. Asynchronous distributed transactions do not requirethe GM to wait for the commit, and allow it to finish processing themessage regardless of whether the distributed transaction commits ornot. Asynchronous distributed transactions are only used to update datafor which database consistency is not an absolute requirement: sequencenumbers and biometric checksum recordings may be performedasynchronously, whereas creating database records, such as BuyerBiometric records, may not.

When executing a synchronous distributed transaction, the requesting GMonly considers the entire transaction successful if all sites cansuccessfully commit the transaction locally. Otherwise, the GMs back outthe changes locally and reject the request due to a transaction error.

The list of valid DPC sites is normally all of the sites. In the case ofan extreme site failure, however, a system administrator may manuallyremove that site from the valid site list. The most likely cause ofdistributed transaction failures, however, are temporary networkfailures that are unrelated to any DPC equipment. Messages that requirea synchronous distributed transaction cannot be performed until networkconnectivity is restored or the site is removed from the valid sitelist. Before a site can be added back to the valid site list, the systemadministrator brings the site's databases up to date with those of acurrently active site.

1.5.10.3. Software Components

Each GM runs the following software components locally for performancereasons:

Message Processing Module

Message Authentication Code Module

Message Decrypt Module

Individual Biometric Database Machine List

1.5.10.4. Message Bandwidth

The message bandwidth required by the GMs is similar to that required bythe FW Machines. A FDDI network interface provides 100 MBits per secondand easily covers any bandwidth requirements.

1.5.11 DPC LAN 1.5.11.1 Purpose

The DPC Local Area Network (LAN) links the machines of the DPC sitestogether using a fiber optic token ring. The fiber optic token ringprovides both high bandwidth and good physical security.

1.5.11.2 Security

The network interfaces used by the machines on the DPC LAN includeencryption hardware to make tapping or intercepting packets uselesswithout the encryption key. The encryption key is the same for allmachines on the LAN and is stored in the encryption hardware.

A properly configured network sniffer acts as an intruder detector asbackup for the FW. If an anomalous message is detected, the intrudingmessages are recorded in their entirety, an operator is alerted, and theFW is physically shut down by the sniffer.

1.5.12 Message Processing Module 1.5.12.1 Purpose

The Message Processing Module (MPM) handles the processing for amessage. It communicates with other components of the DPC as necessaryto perform its tasks. The presence of an MPM on a machine brands it as aGM.

1.5.12.2 Usage

The MPM maintains a message context for each message it is currentlyprocessing. The message context includes the information necessary tomaintain the network connection to the terminal making the message, theBIA device information, the response key, and the response packet.

1.5.13. Message Authentication Code Module 1.5.13.1. Purpose

The Message Authentication Code Module's (MACM) tasks are to validatethe Message Authentication Code on inbound packets and to add a MessageAuthentication Code to outbound packets.

1.5.13.2. Usage

The MACM maintains an in-memory hash table of 112-bit MAC encryptionkeys keyed by BIA hardware identification code. When the MACM receives arequest from the GM to validate a packet's MAC, in first looks up thepacket's hardware identification code in the hash table. If no entryexists, then the MACM replies to the GM with an "invalid hardwareidentification code" error.

Otherwise, the MACM performs a MAC check on the BIA message part of thepacket using the 112-bit MAC encryption key. If the MAC check fails,then the MACM replies to the GM with an "invalid MAC" error. Otherwise,the MACM replies with a "valid MAC" message.

If the packet contains a seller identification code, the MACM alsochecks the seller identification code against the owner identificationcode in the hash table. If the codes don't match, then the MACM replieswith an "invalid owner" error.

When the MACM receives a request from the GM to generate a MAC for apacket, it looks up the MAC encryption key using the packet's hardwareidentification code. With the MAC encryption key, the MACM generates aMAC and adds it to the packet. If the MACM cannot find the hardwareidentification code in its hash table, it replies with an invalidhardware identification code error instead.

1.5.13.3. Database Schema

The MACM hash table entry contains:

MACM Entry:

hardwareId=int4

ownerdId=int4

macEncryptionKey=int16

The table is hashed by hardware identification code.

1.5.13.4. Database Size

Assuming 5 million BIA-equipped devices in service, the hash tablerequires about 120 MB of storage. For performance reasons, this hashtable is cached completely in memory.

1.5.13.5. Dependencies

The MACM only contains records referencing active BIA hardwareidentification codes and active apparatus owners. Whenever an apparatusor apparatus owner is suspended or deleted from the system, the MACMremoves any entries that reference the identification code. When anapparatus is activated, the MACM then adds an entry for it.

The MACM also caches the MAC encryption key from the Valid ApparatusDatabase. Since the system does not allow the encryption key of a BIA tobe changed, the MACM does not need to worry about receiving encryptionkey updates.

1.5.14. Message Decrypt Module 1.5.14.1. Purpose

The Message Decrypt Module's (MDM) task is to reconstruct the DUKPTtransaction key and with it decrypt the biometric-PIN block of thepacket. It maintains a list of the DUKPT Base Keys that are required togenerate the transaction key.

1.5.14.2. Usage

The MDM constructs the DUKPT transaction key using the packet's sequencenumber as the DUKPT transaction counter, the upper 22 bits of the BIAhardware identification code as the DUKPT tamper resistant securitymodule (or "TRSM") Identification, and the low 10 bits of the BIAhardware identification code as the DUKPT Key Set Identification.

The DUKPT standard specifies how the transaction key is generated. TheKey Set Identification is used to look up a Base Key from the Base KeyList. The Base Key is used to transform the TRSM Identification into theinitial key via a DES encrypt/decrypt/encrypt cycle. The transactioncounter is then applied to the initial key as a series of DESencrypt/decrypt/encrypt cycles to generate the transaction key.

For additional security, two Base Key Lists are maintained, one for lowsecurity BIA devices and one for high security devices. The MDM chooseswhich Base Key List to use depending on the security level of thedevice.

1.5.14.3. Database Schema

The MDM Base Key List entry contains:

MDM Entry:

baseKey=int16

The Base Key List is indexed by Key Set Identification.

1.5.14.4. Database Size

The MDM maintains an in-memory list of the DUKPT Base Keys. Each keyrequires 112-bits. The MDM maintains two sets of 1024 keys requiring 32KB total.

1.5.14.5. Dependencies

The MDM has no direct dependencies on any other DPC component.

1.5.15. PIN Group List 1.5.15.1. Purpose

The PIN Group List (PGL), in conjunction with the Individual BiometricDatabase Machine List, defines the configuration of the IBD machines.The PGL stores a list of the PIN groups in the system which is used tosimplify the management of the PINs. A PIN group is a set of consecutivePIN codes. A PGL exists on each GM Machine (GM).

1.5.15.2. Usage

The PGL, when given a PIN code, searches through its list of PIN groupsfor the group containing the PIN code. The PGL maintains the list ofgroups in order and uses a binary search to quickly find the correctgroup.

The initial configuration for the PGL is one giant PIN group containingall possible PINs. After a threshold number of PINs are assigned, thegiant PIN group is split in two. Thereafter, this process is applied toall succeeding PIN groups.

When a PIN group splits, the PGL assigns a new main and backup IBDmachine based on available storage on a first-come-first serve basis.The PGL coordinates with the IBD machines to first copy the affectedrecords from the old main and backup machines to the new ones, updatethe IML record, and last remove the old main and backup copies.Splitting a PIN group is an involved task. The PGL batches splitrequests to be run when the DPC is lightly loaded, for instance, atnight.

The system administrator may also change the main and backup IBDmachines for a given PIN group if the machines' free storage falls belowa level required for handling the expected amount of new registrations.

1.5.15.3. Database Schema

The schema for the PIN Group records are:

PINGroup:

lowPin=int8

highPin=int8

used=int4

Each PIN group is identified by a unique identifier. For convenience thePIN group identification code is the lowPin code for the group, howeverthe system does not otherwise rely upon this fact.

The PGL is keyed by the lowPin field.

1.5.15.4. Database Size

The PGL is expected to contain about 3000 groups (each PIN groupcontains about 1000 active PINs, but may span millions of actual PINs).The entire PGL requires about 72 KB of storage and is cached completelyin memory.

1.5.15.5. Dependencies

When PIN groups are added, merged, or split up, the PGL is responsiblefor informing the IBD Machine List of the changes and for directing themovement of IBD records from one IBD machine to another.

1.5.16. Individual Biometric Database Machine List 1.5.16.1. Purpose

The IBD Machine List (IML), in conjunction with the PIN Group List,codifies the configuration of the IBD machines. The IML maps a PIN codeto the main and backup IBD machines storing IBD records for the PIN. TheIML is actually keyed by PIN Group (a set of consecutive PIN codes)rather than by buyer PINs because this greatly reduces the memoryrequired to store the list. An IML exists on each GM Machine (GM).

1.5.16.2. Usage

When a GM processes a message that requires a biometric identification,the GM finds the IML record keyed by the biometric PIN group. The GMthen knows the main and backup IBD machines to use for the biometricidentification.

Most IBD records will be buyers, who will use the system to purchaseproducts from sellers at points of sale. The rest of the records will begenerally associated with people who perform administrative functionssuch as registration, or customer support.

1.5.16.3. Database Schema

The schema for the IML list entries are:

MachinePair:

pinGroup=int8

main=int2,

backup=int2

The IML is keyed by pinGroup.

1.5.16.4. Database Size

The IML is expected to contain about 3000 entries (the number of PINGroups). Each MachinePair record is 12 bytes requiring about 36 KB ofstorage and is cached completely in memory.

1.5.16.5. Dependencies

Any changes in the configuration of the IBD machines are reflected inthe IML. In addition, the IML uses PIN groups for its keys so when thePIN Group List gets modified, the IML is also updated.

1.5.17. Sequence Number Module 1.5.17.1. Purpose

The Sequence Number Module's (SNM) primary function is to prevent replayattacks by validating packet sequence numbers. Its secondary task is tominimize the effects of a resubmission attack by informing other SNMs inremote DPC sites of sequence number updates and to periodically updatethe sequence numbers in the Valid Apparatus Database.

The SNM maintains an in-memory hash table of sequence numbers keyed byBIA hardware identification code codes to allow quick validation ofpacket sequence numbers.

1.5.17.2. Usage

When the SNM receives a validate request from the GM for a givenhardware identification code and sequence number, it looks up thehardware identification code in the hash table. If no entry exists, thenthe SNM replies to the GM with an "invalid hardware identification code"error.

Otherwise, the SNM checks the given sequence number against the sequencenumber stored in the hash table entry. If the sequence number is lessthan or equal to the stored sequence number, the SNM replies with an"invalid sequence number" error. Otherwise, the SNM sets the sequencenumber in the hash table entry to the given sequence number and replieswith a "valid sequence number" message.

From time to time, the SNM may observe a sequence number gap. A sequencenumber gap occurs when the SNM receives a sequence number that is morethan one greater than the sequence number stored in the hash tableentry. In other words, a sequence number was skipped. When the SNMdiscovers a sequence number gap, it replies with a "sequence number gap"message to the GM instead of a "valid sequence number" message. The GMtreats the packet as valid, but it also logs a "sequence number gap"warning.

Sequence number gaps usually occur when network connectivity is lost:packets are dropped or can't be sent until the network is restored toworking order. However, sequence number gaps occur for fraudulentreasons as well: malicious parties could intercept packets preventingthem from arriving at the DPC or they could even attempt to counterfeitpackets (with a large sequence number so that it isn't immediatelyrejected).

The SNM's secondary function is to inform other DPCs of the updatedsequence numbers. Quickly updating sequence numbers at all DPC sitesthwarts resubmission attacks wherein a malicious entity monitors packetsdestined for one DPC site and immediately sends a copy to a differentDPC site in the hope of exploiting the transmission delay of sequencenumber updates from one DPC site to another resulting in both sitesaccepting the packet as valid, when only the first site should acceptthe packet.

The SNMs send update messages to each other whenever they receive avalid sequence number. If an SNM receives an update message for asequence number that is less than or equal to the sequence numbercurrently stored in its hash table, that SNM logs a sequence numberresubmission warning. All resubmission attacks are detected in thismanner.

A simpler way to thwart resubmission attacks completely, is to have onlyone SNM validate packets. Under this scheme, there is no updatetransmission delay window to exploit with a resubmission attack.Alternately, multiple SNMs can be active at the same time provided noneof them handle sequence number validation for the same BIA-equippeddevice.

1.5.17.3. Sequence Number Maintenance

When the SNM boots up, it loads the sequence number hash table from thesequence numbers for active BIA stored in the VAD.

Once per day, the SNM downloads the current sequence numbers to thelocal Valid Apparatus Database (VAD).

The VAD is responsible for sending add-entry and remove-entry messagesto the SNMs for any BIA-equipped devices that are activated ordeactivated to keep the SNM hash table up-to-date.

1.5.17.4. Database Schema

The SNM hash table entry contains:

SNM Entry:

hardwareId=int4

sequenceNumber=int4

The hash table is keyed by hardwareId.

1.5.17.5. Database Size

Assuming about 5 million BIA-equipped devices in service requires thehash table to be about 40 MB.

1.5.17.6. Dependencies

The SNM depends on the Valid Apparatus Database. When an apparatus issuspended or removed from the database, the SNM removes thecorresponding entry. When an apparatus is activated, the SNM creates anentry for it.

1.5.17.7. Message Bandwidth

The SNMs require a transmission bandwidth of about 8 KB per second tohandle 1000 update sequence number messages per second. The updatesequence number messages is buffered and sent out once per second tominimize the number of actual messages sent.

1.5.18. Apparatus Owner Database 1.5.18.1. Purpose

The Apparatus Owner Database (AOD) stores information on buyers ororganizations that own one or more BIA-equipped devices. Thisinformation is used to double check that the BIA devices are used onlyby their rightful owners, to provide financial account information forfinancial credit and debit transactions, and to allow identification ofall BIAs owned by a specific buyer or organization.

Most BIA devices will be owned by sellers, i.e. sellers engaged inselling to buyers wishing to buy products.

1.5.18.2. Usage

Each AOD record includes a financial account to credit or debit theowner when the DPC processes a financial transaction submitted by one ofthe owner's BIA-equipped devices. For instance, transactions submittedfrom BIA attached to a retail point of sale terminal involves credits tothe owner's financial account.

1.5.18.3. Database Schema

The schema for the Apparatus Owner record is:

Apparatus Owner:

ownerId=int4

name=char50

address=char50

zipCode=char9

financialAccount=char16

status=int1

The status field is one of:

0: suspended

1: active

The Apparatus Owner Database is keyed by ownerId.

1.5.18.4. Database size

The AOD is expected to store about 2 million Apparatus Owner records.Each entry is 130 bytes requiring about 260 MB of storage. The AOD isstored as a hashed file keyed by owner identification code. A copy ofthe AOD is stored on each GM.

1.5.18.5. Dependencies

When entries are removed or suspended from the AOD, any Valid ApparatusDatabase records that reference those apparatus owners are marked assuspended. In addition, the MAC Module and the Sequence Number Moduleremove their entries for the suspended apparatuses.

1.5.19. Valid Apparatus Database 1.5.19.1. Purpose

The Valid Apparatus Database (VAD) is a collection of recordsrepresenting all of the BIAs that have been manufactured to date. TheVAD record contains the Message Authentication Code encryption key foreach BIA, as well as an indication of whether a BIA is active, awaitingshipment, or marked as destroyed. In order for a message from a BIA tobe decrypted, the BIA must exist and have an active record in the VAD.

1.5.19.2. Usage

When manufactured, each BIA has a unique public identification code. Inaddition, each BIA is injected with a unique MAC encryption key, and aninitial DUKPT key, all of which are entered into the VAD record prior toBIA deployment.

When a BIA is first constructed, it is given a unique hardwareidentification code. When a BIA is placed in service, its hardwareidentification code is registered with the system. First, the owner orresponsible party of the BIA is entered into the Apparatus OwnerDatabase (AOD). Then, the VAD record is pointed to the AOD record, andthe BIA is then set active. Messages from that BIA are accepted by theDPC.

When a BIA enters service, the installing agent performs an attendantsecurity assessment, determining the relative attentiveness theorganization pays towards fraud-fighting and the like. Likewise, thegeography of the surrounding area is examined; high crime neighborhoodswill merit a lower security value, for instance. These values are placein the VAD record for the device. These can change over time.

When a BIA is removed from service, it is marked as inactive, and thelink to the AOD record is broken. No communications from that BIA areaccepted.

Each BIA type and model has a device security assessment performed on itduring its design and construction. This represents the basic ability ofthe device to resist attempts to monitor the BIA's internal functioning,the ability of the BIA to keep both past and current encryption keysstored on the BIA secret, and the BIA's ability to resist reprogrammingby criminals.

The number of failed messages, recent messages, and the average numberof messages performed by a given apparatus are recorded in the VADrecord, to assist the security factors module in detecting fraudulentmessages. Periodically, the recentReqs and the failedReqs fields arecleared.

1.5.19.3. Database Schema

The schema for the Valid Apparatus record is:

Valid Apparatus:

hardwareId=int4

macEncryptionKey=int16

ownerId=int8

mfgDate=time

inServiceDate=time

deviceSecurity=int2

locationSecurity=int2

attendentSkill=int2

failedReqs=int2

recentReqs=int2

avgReqs=int2

status=int1

type=int1

use=int1

Possible values for the status field are:

0: suspended

1: active

2: destroyed

Possible values for the type field are (one for each type of terminal):

0: BRT

1: CPT

2: CST

3: IPT

4: IT

5: PPT

6: RPT

Possible values for the use field are:

0: retail

1: personal

2: issuer

3: remote

The Valid Apparatus Database is keyed by hardware identification code.

1.5.19.4. Database Size

The VAD handles about 5 million retail, issuer, and remote ValidApparatus entries. Each entry is 51 bytes requiring about 255 MB total.The VAD is stored as a hashed file keyed by hardware identificationcode. A copy of the VAD is stored on each GM.

The number of personal Valid Apparatus entries number in the range of 30million requiring an additional 1.5 GB of storage.

1.5.19.5. Dependencies

When a VAD record changes status, the MAC Modules and Sequence NumberModules are informed of its change in status. For instance, when anapparatus becomes active, the MACP and SNM adds an entry for the newlyactive apparatus. When an apparatus becomes inactive, the MACP and SNMremove their entry for the apparatus.

1.5.20. Individual Biometric Database 1.5.20.1. Purpose

Individual Biometric Database (IBD) records store personal informationon buyers for both identification as well as authentication. Thisinformation includes their primary and secondary biometrics, one or morePIN codes, a list of financial accounts, account index codes, accountindex names, private code, one or more emergency account index codes,address, and phone number. The buyer may optionally include this SSN.This information is necessary for identifying a buyer either bybiometric or personal information, for accessing related information, orfor providing an address or phone number to remote sellers foradditional verification.

1.5.20.2. Usage

Buyers are added to the system during the buyer enrollment process atregistered Buyer Registration Terminals located in retail bankingestablishments worldwide, or in local system offices. During enrollment,buyers select their personal identification numbers, and add financialaccounts to their biometric and PIN combination.

Buyers may be removed from the database due to fraudulent activityreported by any issuing member. If this occurs, the buyer's record ismoved from the IBD to the Prior Fraud Database (PFD) by an authorizedinternal systems representative. The biometric Ids for records in thePFD may not be used for records in the IBD.

The IBD exists on multiple machines, each of which is responsible for asubset of the IBD records with a copy of each record stored on twodifferent machines, both for redundancy and for load-sharing. The IBDMachine List, stored on the GM, maintains which machines hold whichPINs.

1.5.20.3. Database Schema

The schema for the Buyer Biometric record is:

BuyerBiometric:

primaryBiometric=biometric

secondaryBiometric=biometric

biometricId=int4

PIN=char10

phoneNumber=char12

lastName=char24

firstName=char24

middleInitial=char2

SSN=char9

privateCode=char40

address=char50

zipCode=char9

publicKey=char64

checksums=int4 10!

accountIndexCodes=char30 10!

accountIndexNames=char30 10!

emergencyIndexCode=char1

emergencyLink=char1

privs=char10

enroller=int8

silentAlarmCount=int4

silentAlarmBehavior=int2

status=int1

The status field is one of:

0: suspended

1: active

2: priorFraud

The IBD is keyed by PIN.

The silent alarm behavior is a list of mutually non-exclusive options,including "notify authorities", "reject attended transaction", "rejectunattended transaction", "$150 transaction limit", or "present falseprivate code."

1.5.20.4. Database Indexes

Each IBD machine has additional indexes on the buyer's Social SecurityNumber, biometric identification code, last name, first name, and phonenumber to facilitate access to the IBD database.

1.5.20.5. Database Size

Each IBD machine has 40 GB of secondary storage provided by one or moreRAID devices.

Each IBD record is 2658 bytes (assuming the biometrics are 1K apiece)allowing up to 15 million records per machine. The IBD records arestored using a (perhaps clustered) secondary index on the PIN. The indexis stored in memory and requires no more than 64 MB (a 64 MB indexhandles about 16 million entries). To store records for 300 millionbuyers, the DPC needs at least 40 IBD machines: 20 IBD machines for mainstorage and another 20 for backup. The number of IBD machines is easilyscaled up or down depending on the number of registered buyers.

1.5.20.6. Dependencies

The IBD machines, PIN Group List, and the IBD Machine List remainup-to-date in terms of which PINs are on which machine. When a PIN groupis reconfigured or main and backup machines for PIN groups are changed,the IBD machines update their databases and indexes appropriately.

1.5.21. Authorized Individual Database 1.5.21.1. Purpose

For each issuer or personal BIA-equipped device, the AuthorizedIndividual Database (AID) maintains a list of buyers who are authorized,by the owner of the device, to use it.

The AID exists for two reasons. The first is that it provides restrictedaccess to a terminal. For example, the Issuer Terminal can only be usedby an authorized bank representative. The second reason for the AID isto prevent criminals from secretly replacing the BIA in a retail pointof sale terminal with that of a personal BIA from a phone Terminal andthus routing all purchases to a remote seller financial account set upby the criminals.

1.5.21.2. Database Schema

The schema for the Authorized Individual record is:

Authorized Individual:

hardwareId=int4

biometricId=int4

The hardwareId refers to a record in the Valid Apparatus Database andthe biometricId refers to a record in the Individual Biometric Database.Whenever the DPC needs to check whether an individual is authorized touse a personal or issuer BIA device, the DPC checks for the existence ofan Authorized Individual record with the correct hardwareId andbiometricId.

Personal BIA devices are identified by a use field set to 1 (personal)in the Valid Apparatus Database. Issuer BIA devices are identified by ause field set to 2 (issuer) in the Valid Apparatus Database.

1.5.21.3. Database Size

Assuming each issuer terminal has 10 individuals authorized to use itand an each personal device has two authorized individuals with1,000,000 personal devices in the server, the AID stores about:

10 * 100,000+2 * 1,000,000=3,000,000 entries

The entire database requires about 24 MB of storage.

1.5.21.4. Dependencies

When Authorized Owner Database records or Valid Apparatus Databaserecords are removed, all Authorized Individual records referencing themare removed.

1.5.22. Prior Fraud Database 1.5.22.1. Purpose

The Prior Fraud Database (PFD) is a collection of records representingbuyers who have defrauded member issuers at some point in the past. Thisdatabase allows the DPC to perform a re-registration check on every newregistrant quickly, since only a small number of buyers will bedesignated as having defrauded member issuers. The PFD also runsbackground transactions during periods of low system activity to weedout buyers in the IBD who have matching records in the PFD.

The system does not automatically put buyers in the PFD, unless itdetects that they are attempting to register again. Placing a buyer inthe PFD is a sensitive policy matter which is outside the scope of thisdocument.

1.5.22.2. Usage

Before a new IBD record is marked as active, the buyer's primary andsecondary biometrics are checked against each and every biometric in thePFD using the same biometric comparison techniques as those used in thebuyer identification procedure. If a match is found for the new IBDrecord, the IBD record's status is designated with a label of "priorfraud", and the GM logs a "registering buyer with prior fraud" warning.

It is assumed that the PFD will remain relatively small. The cost to runthe PFD is expensive, as it is an involuntary biometric search, so it isimportant to add only those buyers to the PFD who have imposed asignificant cost to the system.

1.5.22.3. Database Schema

The schema for the Prior Fraud record is:

Prior Fraud:

primaryBiometric=biometric

secondaryBiometric=biometric

biometricId=int4

PIN=char10

phoneNumber=char12

lastName=char24

firstName char24

middleInitial=char2

SSN=char9

privateCode=char40

address=char50

zipCode=char9

publicKey=char64

checksums=int4 10!

accountLinks=char30 10!

emergencyIndex=char1

emergencyLink=char1

privs=char10

enroller=int8

emergencyUseCount=int4

status=int1

The status field is one of:

0: suspended

1: active

2: prior fraud

The PFD is keyed by biometric identification code.

1.5.22.4. Database Size

The PFD record is the same as the IBD record. Fortunately, the DPC needsto store a lot less of them so only two database machines are requiredto store the entire database, of which one is the backup.

1.5.22.5. Dependencies

The PFD does not have any direct dependencies on any other DPCcomponent.

1.5.23. Issuer Database 1.5.23.1. Purpose

The Issuer Database (ID) stores information on banks and other financialinstitutions that allow their financial accounts to be accessed throughthe system. For many financial accounts, such as bank financial accountssuch as savings or checking accounts, the issuing institutions are theonly entities that can add or remove their financial account numbers toa given buyer's IBD record.

1.5.23.2. Usage

The DPC uses the ID to validate messages from Issuer Terminals bysearching the ID for a record containing the Issuer Terminal's issuercode. The owner Identification stored in the record must match up withthe owner stored in the Valid Apparatus Database for the BIA stored inthe Issuer Terminal.

The schema for the Issuer record is:

Issuer Record:

issuerCode=int6

ownerId=int4

name=char50

phoneNumber=char12

address=char50

zipCode=char9

The Issuer Database is keyed by issuerCode.

1.5.23.3. Database Size

The Issuer Database handles about 100,000 entries. Each entry is 127bytes requiring less than 2 MB. A copy of the ID is stored on each GM.

1.5.23.4. Dependencies

The Issuer Database does not have any direct dependencies on any otherDPC component.

1.5.26. Remote Seller Database 1.5.26.1. Purpose

The Remote Seller Database (RSD) stores information on sellers thatprovide goods or services over telephones, cable television networks, orthe Internet. Each order sent by a buyer using a properly-equippedterminal is routed through the seller's order terminal to the system.

1.5.26.2. Usage

Once a buyer's remote commercial transaction is received and the MACvalidated by the DPC, the seller identification code is compared againstthe seller identification code in the RSD. The seller identificationcode, be it phone number, seller-product credential, or Internetaddress, exists in the RSD record under the correct selleridentification code or the DPC terminates the message and returns aninvalid seller identification code error to the sending BIA terminaldevice.

1.5.26.3. Database Schema

The schema for the Remote Seller record is:

Remote Seller:

sellerId=int4

sellerCode=char16

sellerType=int1

publicKey=int16

The Remote Seller sellerType is one of:

0: telephone

1: CATV

2: Internet

The sellerId and sellerCode are both primary keys. No two RSD recordshave the same sellerId and sellerCode combination.

1.5.26.4. Database Size

Assuming about 100,000 remote sellers, the RSD requires about 24 bytesper record for a total of about 2.4 MB storage required.

1.5.26.5. Dependencies

The RSD does not have any direct dependencies on any other DPCcomponents.

1.5.27. System Performance

The key performance number is how many financial authorizationtransactions the DPC handles per second. The tasks required to process atransaction along with an estimate of the time cost to complete themfollows:

In GM:

1. MACM checks the MAC (local)

2. SNM checks the sequence number (network message)

3. MDM decrypts the biometric-PIN block (local)

4. Find IBD machine (local)

5. Send identify message to the IBD machine (network message)

In IBD machine:

6. Retrieve all IBD records for the PIN (x seeks and x reads, where x isthe number of pages required to store the biometric records).

7. For each record, compare against its primary biometric (y/2 ms wherey is the number of records retrieved).

8. If no reasonable match, repeat step 9 but compare against thesecondary biometric (z * y/2 ms, where y is the number of recordsretrieved and z is the probability no match is found).

9. Update the best matching IBD record's checksum queue and check forpossible replay attacks (1 seek, 1 read, and 1 write).

10. Return the best matching IBD record or an error if the match is notclose enough (network message).

In GM:

11. Authorize message with an external processor (network message)

12. GM encrypts and MACs the response (local).

13. Sends response packet back (network message).

Transaction Per Second Estimates:

    x*(s+r)+y/2*(1+z)+s+r+w+5* n=(x+1)*(s+r)+y/2*(1+z)+w+5*n

assume x is 20, y is 30, z is 5%; s=10 ms, r=0 ms, w=0 ms, n=0 ms!

=21 * 10 ms+15 * 1.05 ms

=226 ms

=4.4 TPS

assume x is 10, y is 15, z is 5%; s=10 ms, r=0 ms, w=0 ms, n=0 ms!

=11 * 10 ms+7.5 * 1.05 ms

=118 ms

=8.4 TPS

assume x is 1, y is 1, z is 5%; s=10 ms, r=0 ms, w=0 ms, n=0 ms!

=2 * 10 ms+1/2* 1.05 ms

=21 ms

=47 TPS

The backup IBD machine also processes messages doubling effective TPS.

    ______________________________________            Buyers/PIN     TPS    ______________________________________            Worst case (with 2 machines in use):            30             8            15             16            1              94            Average case (with 20 machines in use):            30             88            15             168            1              940            Best case (with 40 machines in use):            30             176            15             336            1              1880    ______________________________________

The above is just an example of one configuration of the system as itcould be implemented in a commercially viable manner. However, it isanticipated that this invention can be configured in many other wayswhich could incorporate the use of faster computers, more computers, andother such changes.

1.6. Terminal Protocol Flowchart

The following set of protocol flows describe interactions betweenspecific terminals, the DPC, the attached BIA, and other parties such asthe credit/debit processor, and so on.

1.6.1. Retail Point of Sale Terminal

In this case, an RPT communicates with a retail BIA and the DPC toauthorize a transaction. The transaction amount is 452.33, the buyer'sfinancial account is 4024-2256-5521-1212 seller identification code is123456, and the buyer's private code is "I am fully persuaded of it."

RPT→BIA Set Language <English>

BIA→RPT OK

RPT→BIA Get Biometric <20>

BIA/LCD: <Please place finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places finger on scanner

BIA→RPT OK

RPT→BIA Get Pin <40>

BIA/LCD: <Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters PIN, then <enter>

BIA→RPT OK

RPT→BIA Get Account Index Code <40>

BIA/LCD: <Now enter your account index code, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters code, then <enter>

BIA→RPT OK

RPT→BIA Validate Amount <452.33> <40>

BIA/LCD: <Amount 452.33 OK?>

Buyer enters OK

BIA→RPT OK

RPT→BIA Assign Register <1> <123456>

BIA→RPT OK

RPT→Form Message <Commercial Transaction Message>

BIA→RPT <Commercial Transaction Message>

BIA→RPT OK

BIA/LCD: <I'm talking to DPC Central>

RPT→DPC <Commercial Transaction Message>

DPC: validate biometric, retrieve financial accountnumber→4024-2256-5521-1212

DPC→VISA <authorize 4024-2256-5521-1212 452.33 123456>

VISA→DPC <OK 4024-2256-5521-1212 452.33 123456 autho-code>DPC: getprivate code

DPC→RPT <Transaction Response Message>

RPT→BIA Show Response <Transaction Response Message> <8>

BIA/LCD: <Transaction ok: I am fully persuaded of it>

BIA→RPT <OK <autho-code>>RPT: prints receipt with autho-code on it

1.6.2. Internet Point of Sale Terminal

In this case, an IPT communicates with a standard BIA and the DPC toauthorize a transaction. The transaction amount is 452.33, the buyer'sfinancial account is 4024-2256-5521-1212, the Internet seller is locatedat seller.com, his seller identification code is 123456, and the buyer'sprivate code is "I am fully persuaded of it."

IPT→seller.com <send me seller identification code if resourcesavailable>seller.com→IPT <OK 123456 seller.com-public-key>

IPT generates session key, encrypted with seller.com-public-key

IPT→seller.com <session key>

All subsequent communications with seller are encrypted with sessionkey.

seller.com→IPT <price and product information>

IPT/Screen: displays price and product information

Buyer: selects item "fruitcake, price 45.33"

IPT→BIA Set Language <English>

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Get Biometric <20>

BIA/LCD: <Please place finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places finger on scanner

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Get Pin <40>

BIA/LCD: <Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters PIN, then <enter>

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Get Account Index Code <40>

BIA/LCD: <Now enter your account index code, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters code, then <enter>

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Validate Amount <45.33> <40>

BIA/LCD: <Amount 45.33 OK?>

Buyer enters OK

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Assign Register <1> <123456>

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Assign Register <2> <seller.com>

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Assign Register <3> <fruitcake>

BIA→IPT OK

IPT→BIA Form Message <remote transaction>

BIA→IPT <Commercial Transaction Message>

BIA→IPT OK

BIA/LCD: <I'm talking to DPC Central>

IPT→seller.com <Commercial Transaction Message>

seller.com→secure-connect to DPC using DPC public key

seller.com→DPC <Commercial Transaction Message>

DPC: validate biometric, retrieve financial accountnumber→4024-2256-5521-1212

DPC: validate Internet seller.com with code 123456

DPC→VISA <authorize 4024-2256-5521-1212 45.33 123456>

VISA→DPC <OK 4024-2256-5521-1212 45.33 123456 autho-code>

DPC: get private code

DPC→seller.com <Commercial Transaction Response Message>

seller.com stores autho code

seller.com→IPT <Commercial Transaction Response Message>

IPT→BIA Show Response <Transaction Response Message> <8>

BIA/LCD: <Transaction ok: I am fully persuaded of it>

BIA→IPT <Transaction OK>

1.6.3. Buyer Registration Terminal

In this case, a BRT communicates with a registration BIA and the DPC toregister a buyer with the system.

BRT→BIA Set Language <English>

BIA→BRT OK

BRT→BIA Get Biometric <20> <primary>

BIA/LCD: <Please place PRIMARY finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places primary finger on scanner

BIA→BRT OK

BRT→BIA Get Biometric <20> <secondary>

BIA/LCD: <Please place SECONDARY finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places secondary finger on scanner

BIA→BRT OK

BRT→BIA Get Pin <40>

BIA/LCD: <Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters 123456, then <enter>

BIA→BRT OK

BRT→BIA Get Message Key

BIA→BRT <OK <message key>>

BIA→<Registration Message>

BRT/Screen: <Name: >

Representative enters <Fred G. Shultz>

BRT/Screen: <Address: >

Representative enters <1234 North Main>

BRT/Screen: <Zipcode: >

Representative enters <94042>

BRT/Screen: <Private code: >

Representative queries buyer, then enters <I am fully persuaded of it.>

BRT/Screen: <Financial account list: >

Representative enters <2, 1001-2001-1020-2011>(credit card)

Representative enters <3, 1001-1002-0039-2212>(checking account)

BRT/Screen: <Emergency account index code: >

Representative enters <1, 2>(emergency, credit card)

BRT→Form Message <registration>

BIA→BRT <Registration Message>

BIA→BRT OK

BIA/LCD: <I'm talking to DPC Central>

BRT appends message-key-encrypted personal information to request

BRT→DPC Registration Message> <encrypted personal information>

DPC: verify PIN 123456

DPC→BRT <Registration Response Message>

BRT→BIA Show Response <Registration Response Message> <8>

BIA/LCD: <Registration ok: I am fully persuaded of it, 123456>

BIA→BRT <OK>

1.6.4. Customer Service Terminal

In this case, a CST communicates with a standard BIA and the DPC toverify the identity and the credentials of a buyer.

CST→BIA Set Language <English>

BIA→CST OK

CST→BIA Get Biometric <20>

BIA/LCD: <Please place finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places finger on scanner

BIA→CST OK

CST→BIA Get Pin <40>

BIA/LCD: <Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters PIN, then <enter>

BIA→CST OK

CST→BIA Get Message Key

BIA→CST <OK <message key>>

CST→Form Message <Buyer Identification Message>

BIA→CST <Buyer Identification Message>

BIA→CST OK

BIA/LCD: <I'm talking to DPC Central>

CST→DPC <Buyer Identification Message>

DPC: get private code, buyer's priv

DPC→CST <Buyer Identity Response>

CST→BIA Show Response <Buyer Identification Response> <8>

BIA/LCD: <Identity ok: I am fully persuaded of it>

BIA→CST <OK <buyer-name priv>>

CST: check priv to see if sufficient for CST use

1.6.5. Issuer Terminal

In this case, an IT communicates with a standard BIA and the DPC toauthorize and send a batch of account addition and deletion messages tothe DPC. The buyer's private code is "I am fully persuaded of it", andthe bank code is 1200.

IT→BIA Set Language <English>

BIA→IT OK

IT→BIA Get Biometric <20>

BIA/LCD: <Please place finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places finger on scanner

BIA→IT OK

IT→BIA Get Pin <40>

BIA/LCD: <Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters PIN, then <enter>

BIA→IT OK

IT→BIA Assign Register <1> <1200>

BIA→IT OK

IT→BIA Get Message Key

BIA→IT <message key>

BIA→IT OK

IT→BIA Form Message <Issuer Batch message>

BIA→IT <Issuer Batch message>

BIA→IT OK

BIA/LCD: <I'm talking to DPC Central>

IT→DPC <Issuer Batch message> <message-key-encrypted issuer batch>

DPC: validate biometric, validate bank code 1200 vs. BIA identification

DPC: get private code

DPC: decrypt message using message key, execute issuer batch

DPC→IT <Issuer Batch Response>

IT→BIA Show Response <Issuer Batch Response> <8>

BIA/LCD: <Batch ok: I am fully persuaded of it>

BIA→IT <OK>

1.6.6. Phone Point of Sale Terminal

In this case, a PPT communicates with an integrated phone BIA and thetelephone seller to download information and purchase items securelyusing the telephone. The buyer's PIN is 1234, the account index code is1, the seller's phone number is 1 800 542-2231, seller identificationcode 123456, and the actual financial account number is4024-2256-5521-1212.

Note that the telephone strips the area code (1-800) from the telephonenumber before handing it to the system.

Buyer dials phone 18005422231

PPT→connect seller 18005422231

PPT→BIA Assign Register 1 <5422231>

Sales rep answers. Buyer selects item "fruitcake". Sales rep downloadsinfo.

seller→PPT <123456 fruitcake 43.54>

PPT→BIA Get Biometric <20>

Phone/LCD: <Please place finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places finger on scanner

BIA→PPT OK

Phone/LCD: <Please enter your PIN, then press #>

Buyer enters 1234 on keypad, then # or * (enter)

PPT→BIA Set Pin <1234>

BIA→PPT OK

Phone/LCD: <Now enter your account index code>

Buyer enters 1, then <enter>

RPT→BIA Set Account index code <1>

BIA→PPT OK

RPT→BIA Assign Register <2> <123456>

BIA→PPT OK

Phone/LCD: <Press # if amount 45.54 is ok>

Buyer enters # (yes)

PPT→BIA Set Amount <43.54>

BIA→PPT OK

PPT→Form Message <Commercial Transaction message>

BIA→PPT <Remote Transaction Request>

BIA→PPT OK

Phone/LCD: <I'm talking to DPC Central>

PPT→seller <Commercial Transaction Message>

seller→DPC secure-connect to DPC using DPC-public-key

seller→DPC <Commercial Transaction Message>

DPC: validate biometric, retrieve financial accountnumber→4024-2256-5521-1212

DPC: validate seller 5422231 has code 123456

DPC→VISA <authorize 4024-2256-5521-1212 43.54 123456>

VISA→DPC <OK 4024-2256-5521-1212 43.54 123456 autho-code>

DPC: get private code

DPC→seller <Commercial Transaction Response Message>

seller examines response code

seller→PPT <Commercial Transaction Response Message>

PPT→BIA Decrypt Message <Commercial Transaction Response Message>

BIA→PPT <OK <I am fully persuaded of it> <autho-code>>

25 Phone/LCD: <chime>Transaction ok: I am fully persuaded of it

1.6.7. Cable-TV Point of sale Terminal

In this case, a CPT communicates with an integrated cable-tv BIA and theCable television seller to download information and purchase itemssecurely using the cable television broadband network. The buyer's PINis 1234, the account index code is 1, the channel is 5, the selleridentification code 123456, and the actual financial account number is4024-2256-5521-1212.

Buyer turns the television to channel 5.

Seller→CPT <fruitcake 43.54 123456>(broadcast)

Buyer hits "buy" on TV Remote

CPT/TV: <Buying fruitcake for $43.54>

CPT→BIA Get Biometric <20>

CPT/TV: <Please place finger on lighted panel>

Buyer places finger on scanner

BIA→CPT OK

CPT/TV: <Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>>

Buyer enters 1234 on keypad, then "buy"

CPT→BIA Set Pin <1234>

BIA→CPT OK

CPT/TV: <Now enter your account index code>

Buyer enters 1, then <enter>

RPT→BIA Set Account index code <1>

BIA→CPT OK

RPT→BIA Assign Register <1> <channel 5, 15:30:20 PST>

BIA→RPT OK

CPT→BIA Assign Register <2> <123456>

BIA→CPT OK

CPT/TV: <Press "buy" if amount 45.54 is ok>

Buyer enters "buy"

CPT→BIA Set Amount <43.54>

BIA→CPT OK

CPT→Form Message <Commercial Transaction message>

BIA→CPT <Commercial Transaction message>

BIA→CPT OK

CPT/TV: <I'm talking to DPC Central>

CPT→CTV Center <Commercial Transaction Message>

CTV Center seller <Commercial Transaction Message>

seller→DPC secure-connect to DPC using DPC-public-key

seller DPC <Commercial Transaction Message>

DPC: validate biometric, retrieve financial accountnumber→4024-2256-5521-1212

DPC: validate seller channel 5, current show has code 123456

DPC→VISA <authorize 4024-2256-5521-1212 43.54 123456>

VISA→DPC <OK 4024-2256-5521-1212 43.54 123456 autho-code>

DPC: get private code, mailing address

DPC→seller <Transaction Response Message>

seller examines response code, records mailing address

seller→CTV Center <Transaction Response Message>

CTV Center→CPT <Transaction Response Message>

CPT→BIA Decrypt Message <Transaction Response Message>

BIA→CPT <OK <I am fully persuaded of it> <autho-code>>

CPT/TV: <chime>Transaction ok: I am fully persuaded of it From theforegoing, it will be appreciated how the objects and features of theinvention are met. First, the invention provides a computeridentification system that eliminates the need for a user to possess andpresent a physical object, such as a token, in order to authorize atransaction.

Second, the invention provides a computer identification system that iscapable of verifying a user's identity, as opposed to verifyingpossession of proprietary objects and information.

Third, the invention verifies the user's identity based upon one or moreunique characteristics physically personal to the user.

Fourth, the invention provides an identification system that ispractical, convenient, and easy use.

Fifth, the invention provides a system of secured access to a computersystem that is highly resistant to fraudulent transaction authorizationattempts by non-authorized users.

Sixth, the invention provides a computer identification system thatenables a user to notify authorities that a particular access request isbeing coerced by a third party without giving notice to the third partyof the notification.

Although the invention has been described with respect to a particulartokenless identification system and method for its use, it will beappreciated that various modifications of the apparatus and method arepossible without departing from the invention, which is defined by theclaims set forth below.

5. Glossary

ACCOUNT INDEX CODE:

A digit or an alpha-numeric sequence that corresponds to a particularfinancial account

AID:

Authorized Individual Database: contains the list of individualsauthorized to use personal and issuer BIA devices.

AOD:

Apparatus Owner Database: central repository containing the geographicand contact information on the owner of each BIA.

ASCII:

American Standard Code for Information Interchange

SELLER:

A person or entity that proposes transactions to buyers, generally forthe purpose of selling goods and services buyers.

BIA:

Biometric input apparatus; collects biometric identity information,encodes and encrypts it, and makes it available for authorizations.Comes in different hardware models and software versions.

Biometric:

A measurement taken by the system of some aspect of a buyer's physicalperson.

Biometric ID:

An identifier used by the system to uniquely identify an individual'sbiometric record (IRID --Individual Record ID)

BIO-PIN GROUP:

a collection of algorithmically dissimilar biometric samples linked tothe same personal identification number

BRT:

Buyer Registration Terminal; located at retail banking outlets, BRTscombine buyer registration information with a buyer-selected PIN andselected personal information to register buyers with the system.

CBC:

Cipher Block Chaining: an encryption mode for the DES.

CCD:

Charged-Coupled Device

COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION:

A Commercial Transaction involves a seller proposing a transaction to abuyer. If the buyer approves, he appends his biometric and PIN to thetransaction, and sends it to the DPC for authorization and execution.

COMMANDS:

A program or subroutine residing in the DPC that performs a specifictask, activated by a request message sent from a BIA-equipped terminal.

CPT:

Cable-TV Point-of-Sale Terminal: combines an onscreen display simulcastdigital signal informing TV-top cable box of product information withproduct video, and a BIA controller remote which performs thebiometric-pin validation using the CATV communications network.Order/autho/mailing-address/item-id forwarded to seller. Results ofauthorization are displayed on the TV.

CST:

Customer Service Terminals; provide system customer service personnelwith varying degrees of access (based on access privilege) the abilityto retrieve and modify information on buyers in order to help peoplewith account problems.

CUSTOMER:

An individual who can authorize transactions at a point of sale usingnothing more than a biometric and a PIN.

DATA SEALING STEP:

The conversion of plain text to cipher text (known as "encryption") incombination with the encrypted checksumming of a message that allowsinformation to remain in plain text while at the same time providing ameans for detecting any subsequent modification of the message.

DES:

Data Encryption Standard: a standard for the cryptographic protection ofdigital data. See standard ANSI X3.92-1981

DPC:

A data processing center, also known as the computer system, whichrepresents the place and the entity where the hardware, software, andpersonnel are located that support a multigigabyte biometric identitydatabase. A DPC processes electronic messages, most of which involveperforming biometric identity checks as a precursor to performing afinancial transaction.

DSP:

Digital Signal Processor: a class of integrated circuits that specializein the mathematical operations required by the signal processingapplications.

DUKPT:

Derived Unique Key Per Transaction: See standard ANSI/ABA X9.24-1992

EMERGENCY ACCOUNT INDEX CODE:

the alpha-numeric digit or sequence selected by a buyer which, whenaccessed, will result in a transaction being labelled by the system asan emergency transaction, potentially causing the display of falsescreens and/or the notification of authorities that the buyer has beencoerced into performing a transmission or transaction.

FAR (False Accept Rate):

the statistical likelihood that one buyer's biometric will beincorrectly identified as the biometric of another buyer.

FALSE SCREENS:

Displays of information which has been intentionally pre-determined tobe subtly inaccurate such that a coercing party will not illegallyobtain accurate data about a buyer's financial accounts, all the whileremaining unaware of the alteration of the information.

FDDI:

Fiber Digital Device Interface: a networking device that utilizes afiber optic token ring.

FS:

Field Separator

FW:

Firewall Machine: the Internet-local net router that regulates trafficinto and out of the DPC.

GM:

Gateway Machine: the main processing computers in the DPC; runs most ofthe software.

IBD:

Individual Biometric Database: central repository for biometric,financial account, and other personal information. Queries against thebiometric database are used to verify identity for commercialtransactions and transmissions.

ID:

Issuer Database: central repository containing the institutions that areallowed to add and delete financial account numbers with the system.

IML:

IBD Machine List: a software module in the DPC determines which IBDmachines are responsible for which PIN codes.

INTERNET SELLER:

A party selling services or goods to buyers by means of the Internetelectronic network

IPT:

Internet Point-of-Sale Terminal: retrieves items and selleridentification code from the Internet, gathers BIA biometric-PIN forvalidation, sends using Internet, autho/order/PO # forwarded to sellerwho in turn forwards to DPC. DPC response forwarded by seller to IPTusing Internet as well, which displays results on screen.

ISSUER:

a financial account issuer for financial assests to be registered withthe DPC.

ISSUER BATCH:

A collection of "add" and "delete" instructions complete with biometricIDs, financial accounts, and account index codes verified and submittedby an issuer to the DPC.

IT:

Issuer Terminals; provides a batch connection to the system for issuersto add and remove (their own) financial account numbers from specificbuyer's IBD records.

LCD:

Liquid Crystal Display: a technology used for displaying text.

MAC:

Message Authentication Code: an encrypted checksum algorithm, the MACprovides assurance that the contents of a message have not been alteredsubsequent to the MAC calculation. See standard ANSI X9.9-1986

MACM:

Message Authentication Code Module: a software module in the DPC thathandles MAC validation and generation for inbound and outbound packets.

MDM:

Message Decrypt Module: a software module in the DPC that encrypts anddecrypts packets from or destined to a BIA device.

MPM:

Message Processing Module: a software module in the DPC that performsthe processing of request packets.

PFD:

Prior Fraud Database: central repository for IBD records which have hadprior fraud associated with them. During registration, every newapplicant's biometrics are checked to see if a re-registration isoccurring against all PFD records with the intent of reducingrecidivism.

PGL:

PIN Group List: a software module in the DPC that is responsible formaintaining the configuration of the IBD machines.

PIN:

Personal identification number; a password formed from either numbers,symbols, or alphabetic characters that only the rightful account owneris supposed to know.

PPT:

Phone Point of Sale Terminal; allows sellers to collect transactionauthorizationsover a BIA-equipped telephone. Resulting authorization isdisplayed on phone LCD, or "spoken", along with the buyer's privatecode.

RAM:

Random Access Memory

RF:

Radio Frequency: generally refers to radio frequency energy emittedduring the normal operation of electrical devices.

REGISTERS:

Memory reserved for a specific purpose, data set aside on chips andstored operands to instructions

REQUESTS:

Electronic instructions from the BIA to DPC instructing the DPC toidentify the buyer and thereby process the buyer's command in the eventthe identification is successful

RSD:

Remote Seller Database: contains all seller identification codes forseller telephone and Cable TV order shops; indexed by seller ID.Contains per-seller system encryption codes as well.

SNM:

Sequence Number Module: a software module in the DPC that handles theDUKPT sequence number processing for inbound request packets. Sequencenumber processing protects against replayattacks.

Terminal:

A device that uses the BIA to collect biometric samples and form requestmessages that are subsequently sent to the DPC for authorization andexecution. Terminals almost always append ancillary information torequest messages, identifying counterparties and the like.

Token:

An inanimate object conferring a capability.

TRANSACTION:

An electronic financial exchange.

VAD:

Valid Apparatus Database: central repository in which each BIA (withassociated unique encryption codes) is identified, along with the ownerof the BIA.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for tokenless authorization ofcommercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computersystem, the method comprising the steps of:a. a buyer registration step,wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least oneregistration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account;b. a seller registration step, wherein the seller registers with thecomputer system at least one seller financial account and a selleridentification code; c. a proposal step, wherein the seller offers aproposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercialtransaction comprising a seller identification code and priceinformation; d. an acceptance step, wherein the buyer signals acceptanceof the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to theproposed commercial transaction the buyer's personal authenticationinformation comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric samplewherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from thebuyer's person, to form a commercial transaction message; e. atransmission step, wherein the commercial transaction message isforwarded to the computer system; f. a buyer identification step,wherein the computer system compares the personal authenticationinformation in the commercial transaction message with registrationbiometric samples for producing either a successful or failedidentification of the buyer; g. a payment step, wherein upondetermination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyeris debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein acommercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use anyportable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; andh. a presentation step, wherein any combination of the results of stepsa) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller.
 2. The method ofclaim 1 wherein the buyer identification step is accomplished preferablyin less than about 2 seconds, whereby the entire commercial transactionis completed within a commercially acceptable timeframe.
 3. The methodof claim 1 further comprising a computer system authentication stepwherein a private code, distinct from the PIN and not used to gainaccess to the computer system, is gathered from the buyer during thebuyer registration step and presented to only the buyer during thepresentation step, whereby the buyer is assured that the authenticcomputer system was used to process the commercial transaction.
 4. Themethod of claim 1 wherein the buyer registers an emergency PIN duringthe registration step which, if entered by the buyer during theacceptance step in place of the PIN, triggers a silent alarm.
 5. Themethod of claim 1 wherein the price information comprises anycombination of the following: a list of goods and services, a sellername, a date and time, a location, and an invoice number.
 6. The methodof claim 1 wherein the acceptance step further comprises the buyerentering an amount that is the sum of a cash back value to the proposedtransaction amount.
 7. The method of claim 1 wherein the selleridentification code is identical to the seller financial account.
 8. Themethod of claim 1 wherein all communications with the computer systemare encrypted.
 9. The method of claim 1 wherein the biometric sample isa fingerprint.
 10. The method of claim 1 wherein the biometric sample isretinal image.
 11. The method of claim 1 wherein the biometric sample isa voice print.
 12. The method of claim 1 further comprising a biometrictheft resolution step, wherein the PIN of the buyer is changed wheneverthe buyer's biometric sample is determined to have been stolen.
 13. Themethod of claim 1 further comprising a seller identification step,wherein the seller is identified by the computer system.
 14. The methodof claim 1 wherein the buyer is remote from the seller and communicateswith the seller using a computer network.
 15. The method of claim 14wherein the computer network is any one of the group comprising theInternet, a private intranet, a telephone network, or a cable TVnetwork.
 16. The method of claim 1 further comprising a buyerre-registration check step, wherein the buyer's registration biometricsamples are compared against previously designated biometric samples ofcertain buyers wherein if a match occurs, the computer system is alertedto the fact that the buyer has re-registered, whereby buyers whoperpetrate fraud on the system can be automatically identified fromtheir biometrics alone if and when they re-register.
 17. The method ofclaim 16 wherein the biometrics are collected from a specific finger,such as the index finger, whereby the system can more easily detectre-registrations of previously designated biometric samples of certainbuyers by limiting the number of different finger combinations the buyercan use to register without being detected.
 18. The method of claim 1further comprising a security determination step, wherein an evaluationis made using a set of security factors to determine the overalllikelihood of fraud for a particular transaction.
 19. The method ofclaim 18 wherein the security factors are selected from the group of abiometric-PIN input device security assessment, relative skill ofattendant (at an attended location) to detect fraud, physical locationand related neighborhood crime information, time at which theauthorization takes place, number of recently failed authorizationattempts originating from that device, number of recent authorizationsissuing from that device related to the historical number oftransactions from that device.
 20. The method of claim 1 furthercomprising a buyer's resource determination step, wherein aftersuccessful identification of the buyer, a determination is made if thebuyer has sufficient resources to pay for the transaction.
 21. Themethod of claim 20 wherein during the buyer registration step, the buyerregisters at least one buyer financial account and assigns an accountindex code to each buyer financial account, and during the acceptancestep the buyer adds the account index code to the commercial transactionmessage, wherein the account index code further comprises one or morealphanumeric characters.
 22. The method of claim 21 wherein during thebuyer registration step, the buyer registers an emergency account indexcode, which when added to the commercial transaction message during theacceptance step, triggers a silent alarm.
 23. The method of claim 22wherein during the registration step, the buyer specifies anycombination of actions taken upon the triggering of the silent alarmcomprising artificial financial resource limits, presentation of a falseprivate code, rejection of the transaction, or the sending of the silentalarm to the seller.
 24. The method of claim 21 wherein during thebuyer's resource determination step, the computer system uses theaccount index code that was added to the commercial transaction messageto select the corresponding buyer financial account.
 25. The method ofclaim 24 wherein the registration step further comprises assigning anaccount index name to an account index code.
 26. The method of claim 25further comprising an account name display step, wherein a list ofaccounts with their account index names can be retrieved and displayedto the buyer after a successful identification, wherein no transactionneeds to take place if it is desired that the account index names beretrieved.
 27. The method of claim 20 wherein during both the resourcedetermination step and the payment step the computer system communicateswith one or more external computer systems in order to perform anycombination of the following steps: the resource determination, debitingthe buyer's financial account, and crediting the seller's financialaccount.
 28. The method of claim 20 wherein during the payment step, acredit authorization draft is created detailing an agreement to pay theseller from the buyer's financial account up to an amount specifiedduring the proposal step, whereby transactions can be conducted when theexact amount to be transferred is not known at the time of authorizationor when a deposit is required but the account may not ever be debited.29. The method of claim 28 wherein during both the resourcedetermination step and the payment step the computer system communicateswith one or more external computer systems in order to perform anycombination of the following steps: the resource determination or theconstruction of the credit authorization draft.
 30. The method of claim29 wherein one of the external computer systems comprises VISANet orMAPP.
 31. A method for tokenless authorization of commercialtransactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system,wherein the buyer may select one of many registered financial accountsfrom which to make payment, said method comprising the steps of:a. abuyer registration step, wherein the buyer registers with the computersystem a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at leastone buyer financial account, wherein each buyer financial account isassigned an account index code; b. a seller step, wherein the sellerregisters with the computer system at least one seller registrationfinancial account and a seller identification code; c. a proposal step,wherein the seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to thebuyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a selleridentification code and price information; d. an acceptance step,wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercialtransaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction an accountindex code and the buyer's personal authentication informationcomprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bidbiometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person,forming a commercial transaction message; e. a transmission step,wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computersystem; f. a buyer identification steps wherein the computer systemcompares the personal authentication information in the commercialtransaction message with registered biometric samples for producingeither a successful or failed identification of the buyer; g. an accountselection step, wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financialaccount using the account index code from the commercial transactionmessage; h. a payment step, wherein upon determination of sufficientresources, the buyer financial account is debited and a financialaccount of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction isconducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memorydevices such as smart cards or swipe cards; and i. a presentation step,wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through h) arepresented to the buyer or seller, wherein a commercial transaction isconducted from one of many possible buyer accounts.
 32. A method fortokenless authorization of commercial transactions between a buyer and aseller using a computer system, wherein the buyer may select one of manyregistered financial accounts from which to make payment, with aprovision for sending a silent alarm during coerced transactions, themethod comprising the steps of:a. a buyer registration step, wherein thebuyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least oneregistration biometric sample, at least one buyer financial account,wherein each buyer financial account is assigned an account index code,and at least one emergency account index code; b. a seller registrationstep, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least oneseller financial account and a seller identification code; c. a proposalstep, wherein the seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to thebuyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a selleridentification code and price information; d. an acceptance step,wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercialtransaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction an accountindex code and the buyer's personal authentication informationcomprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bidbiometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person,forming a commercial transaction message; e. a transmission step,wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computersystem; f. a buyer identification step, wherein the computer systemcompares the personal authentication information in the commercialtransaction message with registered biometric samples for producingeither a successful or failed identification of the buyer; g. an accountselection step, wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financialaccount using the account index code from the commercial transactionmessage, and if the account index code is the same as the emergencyaccount index code, a silent alarm is sent; h. a payment step, whereinupon determination of sufficient resources, the buyer financial accountis debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein acommercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use anyportable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; andi. a presentation step, wherein any combination of the results of stepsa) through h) are presented to the buyer or seller, wherein a commercialtransaction is conducted from one of many possible buyer accounts, withthe buyer able to signal a silent alarm during any coerced transaction.33. A method for tokenless authorization of commercial transactionsbetween a buyer and a seller using a computer system, the methodcomprising the steps of:a. a buyer registration step, wherein the buyerregisters with the computer system a PIN, at least one registrationbiometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account; b. a sellerregistration step, wherein the seller registers with the computer systemat least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;c. a proposal step, wherein the seller offers a proposed commercialtransaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprisinga seller identification code and price information; d. an acceptancestep, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposedcommercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transactionthe buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and atleast one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample isobtained by the system from the buyer's person, forming a commercialtransaction message; e. a transmission step, wherein the commercialtransaction message is forwarded to the computer system; f. a buyeridentification step, wherein the computer system compares the personalauthentication information in the commercial transaction message withregistered biometric samples for producing either a successful or failedidentification of the buyer; g. a payment step, wherein upondetermination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyeris debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein acommercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use anyportable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; h.a presentation step, wherein any combination of the results of steps a)through g) are presented to the buyer or seller; and i. a biometrictheft resolution step, wherein the PIN of the buyer is changed wheneverthe buyer's biometric record is determined to have been stolen.
 34. Atokenless authorization system for commercial transactions between abuyer and a seller using a computer, comprising:a. means for buyerregistration, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system aPIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyerfinancial account; b. means for seller registration, wherein the sellerregisters with the computer system at least one seller financial accountand a seller identification code; c. means for making an electronicproposal, wherein the seller offers an electronic proposed commercialtransaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprisinga seller identification code and price information; d. means foracceptance of the electronic proposal by the buyer, wherein the buyersignals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction byadding to the proposed commercial transaction the buyer's personalauthentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bidbiometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by thesystem from the buyer's person, the seller's electronic proposal and thebuyer's authentication information forming a commercial transactionmessage; e. means for transmission, wherein the commercial transactionmessage is forwarded to the computer system; f. means for buyeridentification, wherein the computer system compares the personalauthentication information in the commercial transaction message withregistration biometric samples for producing either a successful orfailed identification of the buyer; g. means for electronic payment,wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial accountof the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller iscredited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without thebuyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smartcards or swipe cards; and h. means for status presentation, wherein anycombination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to thebuyer or seller.
 35. The device of claim 34 further comprising means foridentification of the buyer wherein the buyer identification isaccomplished preferably in less than about 2 seconds, whereby the entirecommercial transaction is completed within a commercially acceptabletimeframe.
 36. The device of claim 34 further comprising means forcomputer system authentication wherein a private code, distinct from thePIN and not used to gain access to the computer system, is gathered fromthe buyer during buyer registration and presented to only the buyerduring status presentation, whereby the buyer is assured that theauthentic computer system was used to process the commercialtransaction.
 37. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for thebuyer to register an emergency PIN during the buyer registration which,if entered by the buyer during buyer acceptance in place of the PIN,triggers a silent alarm.
 38. The device of claim 34 wherein the priceinformation comprises any combination of the following: a list of goodsand services, a seller name, a date and time, a location, and an invoicenumber.
 39. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for thebuyer to enter an amount that is the sum of a cash back value to theproposed transaction amount during buyer acceptance.
 40. The device ofclaim 39 wherein the seller identification code is identical to theseller financial account.
 41. The device of claim 34 wherein allcommunications with the computer system are encrypted.
 42. The device ofclaim 34 wherein the biometric sample is a fingerprint.
 43. The deviceof claim 34 wherein the biometric sample is retinal image.
 44. Thedevice of claim 34 wherein the biometric sample is a voice print. 45.The device of claim 34 further comprising means for biometric theftresolution, wherein the PIN of the buyer is changed whenever the buyer'sbiometric sample is determined to have been stolen.
 46. The device ofclaim 34 further comprising a means for seller identification.
 47. Thedevice of claim 34 wherein the buyer is remote from the seller andcommunicates with the seller using a computer network.
 48. The device ofclaim 47 wherein the computer network is any one of the group comprisingthe Internet, a private intranet, a telephone network, or a cable TVnetwork.
 49. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for buyerre-registration check, wherein the buyer's registration biometricsamples are compared against previously designated biometric samples ofcertain buyers wherein if a match occurs, the computer system is alertedto the fact that the buyer has re-registered, whereby buyers whoperpetrate fraud on the system can be automatically identified fromtheir biometrics alone if and when they re-register.
 50. The device ofclaim 49 wherein the biometrics are collected from a specific finger,such as the index finger, whereby the system can more easily detectre-registrations of previously designated biometric samples of certainbuyers by limiting the number of different finger combinations the buyercan use to register without being detected.
 51. The device of claim 34further comprising means for security determination, wherein anevaluation is made using a set of security factors to determine theoverall likelihood of fraud for a particular transaction.
 52. The deviceof claim 51 wherein the security factors are selected from the group ofa biometric-PIN input device security assessment, relative skill ofattendant (at an attended location) to detect fraud, physical locationand related neighborhood crime information, time at which theauthorization takes place, number of recently failed authorizationattempts originating from that device, number of recent authorizationsissuing from that device related to the historical number oftransactions from that device.
 53. The device of claim 34 furthercomprising the means for buyer's resource determination, wherein aftersuccessful identification of the buyer, a determination is made if thebuyer has sufficient resources to pay for the transaction.
 54. Thedevice of claim 53 further comprising means for communication with oneor more external computer systems in order to perform any combination ofthe following: resource determination, debiting the buyer's financialaccount, and crediting the seller's financial account during bothresource determination and electronic payment.
 55. The device of claim53 further comprising means for creation of a credit authorization draftduring the electronic payment detailing an agreement to pay the sellerfrom the buyer's financial account up to an amount specified during theelectronic proposal, whereby transactions can be conducted when theexact amount to be transferred is not known at the time of authorizationor when a deposit is required but the account may not ever be debited.56. The device of claim 55 further comprising means for communicationwith one or more external computer systems in order to perform anycombination of the following: resource determination or construction ofthe credit authorization draft.
 57. The device of claim 56 wherein oneof the external computer systems comprises VISANet or MAPP.
 58. Thedevice of claim 53 wherein means for buyer registration furthercomprises means for registering at least one buyer financial account,the buyer assigning an account index code to each buyer financialaccount, and at the time of buyer acceptance, the buyer adds the accountindex code to the commercial transaction message, wherein the accountindex code further comprises one or more alphanumeric characters. 59.The device of claim 58 further comprising means for registration of anemergency account index code, wherein the buyer registers an emergencyaccount index code, which when added to the commercial transactionmessage during the buyer acceptance, triggers a silent alarm.
 60. Thedevice of claim 59 further comprising means for the buyer to specify anycombination of actions taken upon the triggering of the silent alarmcomprising artificial financial resource limits, presentation of a falseprivate code, rejection of the transaction, or the sending of the silentalarm to the seller during buyer registration.
 61. The device of claim58 wherein means for buyer's resource determination further comprisesmeans for selecting the corresponding buyer financial account throughthe account index code that was added to the commercial transactionmessage.
 62. The device of claim 61 wherein further comprising means forassigning an account index name to an account index code.
 63. The deviceof claim 62 further comprising means for account name display, wherein alist of accounts with their account index names can be retrieved anddisplayed to the buyer after a successful identification, wherein notransaction needs to take place if it is desired that the account indexnames be retrieved.
 64. A tokenless authorization system for commercialtransactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system,wherein the buyer may select one of many registered financial accountsfrom which to make payment, the system comprising:a. means for buyerregistration, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system aPIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyerfinancial account, and each buyer financial account is assigned anaccount index code; b. means for seller registration, wherein the sellerregisters with the computer system at least one seller financial accountand a seller identification code; c. means for making an electronicproposal, wherein the seller offers an electronic proposed commercialtransaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprisinga seller identification code and price information; d. means foracceptance of the electronic proposal by the buyer, wherein the buyersignals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction byadding to the proposed commercial transaction an account index code andthe buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and atleast one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample isobtained by the system from the buyer's person, the seller's electronicproposal and the buyer's authentication information forming a commercialtransaction message; e. means for transmission, wherein the commercialtransaction message is forwarded to the computer system; f. means forbuyer identification, wherein the computer system compares the personalauthentication information in the commercial transaction message withregistration biometric samples for producing either a successful orfailed identification of the buyer; g. means for account selection,wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financial account using theaccount index code from the commercial transaction message; h. means forelectronic payment, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources,a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account ofthe seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conductedwithout the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devicessuch as smart cards or swipe cards; and i. means for statuspresentation, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) throughg) are presented to the buyer or seller.
 65. A tokenless authorizationsystem for commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using acomputer system, wherein the buyer may select one of many registeredfinancial accounts from which to make payment, with a provision forsending a silent alarm during coerced transactions, the systemcomprising:a. means for buyer registration, wherein the buyer registerswith the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometricsample, and at least one buyer financial account, and each buyerfinancial account is assigned an account index code, and at least oneemergency account index code; b. means for seller registration, whereinthe seller registers with the computer system at least one sellerfinancial account and a seller identification code; c. means for makingan electronic proposal, wherein the seller offers an electronic proposedcommercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transactioncomprising a seller identification code and price information; d. meansfor acceptance of the electronic proposal by the buyer, wherein thebuyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transactionby adding to the proposed commercial transaction an account index codeand the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN andat least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample isobtained by the system from the buyer's person, the seller's electronicproposal and the buyer's authentication information forming a commercialtransaction message; e. means for transmission, wherein the commercialtransaction message is forwarded to the computer system; f. means forbuyer identification, wherein the computer system compares the personalauthentication information in the commercial transaction message withregistration biometric samples for producing either a successful orfailed identification of the buyer; g. means for account selection,wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financial account using theaccount index code from the commercial transaction message, and if theaccount index code is the same as the emergency account index code, asilent alarm is sent; h. means for electronic payment, wherein upondetermination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyeris debited and a financial account of the seller is credited wherein acommercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use anyportable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; andi. means for status presentation, wherein any combination of the resultsof steps a) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller, whereby acommercial transaction is conducted from one of many possible buyeraccounts.
 66. A tokenless authorization system for commercialtransactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer,comprising:a. means for buyer registration, wherein the buyer registerswith the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometricsample, and at least one buyer financial account; b. means for sellerregistration, wherein the seller registers with the computer system atleast one seller financial account and a seller identification code; c.means for making an electronic proposal, wherein the seller offers anelectronic proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposedcommercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and priceinformation, d. means for acceptance of the electronic proposal by thebuyer, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposedcommercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transactionthe buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and atleast one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample isobtained by the system from the buyer's person, the seller's electronicproposal and the buyer's authentication information forming a commercialtransaction message; e. means for transmission, wherein the commercialtransaction message is forwarded to the computer system; f. means forbuyer identification, wherein the computer system compares the personalauthentication information in the commercial transaction message withregistration biometric samples for producing either a successful orfailed identification of the buyer; g. means for electronic payment,wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial accountof the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller iscredited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without thebuyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smartcards or swipe cards; h. means for status presentation, wherein anycombination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to thebuyer or seller; and i. means for biometric theft resolution, whereinthe PIN of the buyer is changed whenever the buyer's biometric record isdetermined to have been stolen, and any theft of biometric informationcan be made useless immediately upon detection.